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SUBVERTING SYMBOLISM: THE MATTHEW SHEPARD AND
JAMES BYRD, JR. HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT AND
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

Kami Chavis Simmons*
ABSTRACT

Hate crimes continue to persist in the United States and undermine the
traditions and values to which the country aspires. Until recently, however, the
stringent jurisdictionallimitations of existing federal legislation made it difficult for the federal government to prosecute these crimes. In October 2009,
President Obama signed into law the Matthew Shepard James Byrd Jr, Hate
Crimes Prevention Act (the "HCPA"). The HCPA significantly expands thefederal
government's authority to prosecute defendants accused of hate crimes because it
dispenses with a previous jurisdictional requirement that made it difficult to
prosecute many such crimes. The HCPA also represents an expansion offederal
authority because it protects a broaderclass of victims than pre-existingfederal
hate crimes legislation.In addition to protectingvictims of violent acts based upon
race, color, religion, or nationalorigin, the HCPA is the firstfederal legislation to
protect victims of crimes where the underlying motivation was the victim's sexual
orientation, gender, or gender identity. While many observers view this broad
grant offederal authorityas a monumental civil rightsvictory, critics view it as an
unnecessary symbolic measure that is, in their view, part of a continuing trend
toward "overfederalization" of the criminal law. This Article does not intend to
contribute to the extensive body of scholarship devoted to the symbolism of hate
crimes legislation or the propriety of the federal government's authority to
prosecute such crimes. Instead, this Article refocuses the debate to address new
issues regarding the federal government's enforcement and implementationof this
legislation. Drawing upon the principles of cooperative federalism, this Article
proposes a model of prosecutionthat ensures thefederal government's authority to
prosecute hate crimes is not merely symbolic, but is implemented in a manner that
respects the principles and boundaries of federalism in the criminal justice
context. To accomplish these goals, this Article proposes a regime that relies on
federal-state collaborationto maximize resource allocation in the prosecution of
hate crimes. This proposalalso includes, inter alia, allowing state prosecutors to
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receive special designations to prosecute these cases in federal court. This Article
concludes that a multi-jurisdictionalapproach is necessary to effectively address
hate crimes in the United States.
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Hate crimes are a form of domestic terrorism. They send the poisonous
message that some Americans deserve to be victimized solely because of who
they are. Like other acts of terrorism, hate crimes have an impact far greater
than the impact on the individual victims. They are crimes against entire
communities, against the whole nation, and against the fundamental ideals on
which America was founded. They are a violation of all our country stands
for.
-

Senator Edward Kennedy

And that's why, through this law, we will strengthen the protections against
crimes based on the color of your skin, the faith in your heart, or the place of
your birth. We will finally add Federal protections against crimes based on
gender, disability, gender identity, or sexual orientation. And prosecutors will
have new tools to work with States in order to prosecute to the fullest those
who would perpetrate such crimes, because no one in America should ever be
afraid to walk down the street holding the hands of the person they love. No
one in America should be forced to look over their shoulder because of who
they are or because they live with a disability. 2
- President Barack Obama
INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 2010, three men in New Mexico videotaped themselves burning
a swastika onto the arm of Vincent Kee, a mentally disabled man of Native
American decent. 3 Although the three defendants contend the act was consensual,
the District Attorney charged them with various state offenses including kid-

napping and battery.4 This case, however, is distinct from other violent crimes
because a federal grand jury has also indicted the men involved under the Matthew

1. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Remarks on the Matthew Shepard Act (Sept. 25, 2007), available at
http://tedkennedy.org/ownwords/event/hate_crimes.
2. Remarks on the Enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 2009
DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 859 (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900859.pdf.
3. Elizabeth Piazza, FederalProsecutorsApply 2009 Hate-CrimeActto Local Case, FARMINGTON DAILYTIMES
(N.M.), Nov. 13, 2010. Mr. Kee is member of the Navajo Nation. Id.
4. Id. Specifically, the District Attorney filed first-degree felony kidnapping, second-degree felony conspiracy
to commit kidnapping, third-degree felony aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, and fourth-degree
felony conspiracy to commit aggravated battery. Id.
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Shepard-James Byrd Hate Crime Prevention Act ("HCPA"), a law President
Obama signed on October 29, 2009.5 Prior to the enactment of the HCPA, the
federal government would have lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the defendants in
this case or similar cases involving hate crimes.
The HCPA significantly expands the federal government's authority to prosecute hate crimes, also called bias-motivated crimes, in two important ways. First,
the HCPA grants broad authority to the federal government to prosecute defendants accused of perpetrating violent acts because of the victim's actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, and, unlike other federal legislation,
the HCPA expands this class of victims to also include those victimized because of
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability. 6 Second, in contrast to
pre-existing federal hate crimes legislation, the HCPA does not require victims to
be engaged in federally protected activities when the crime occurs.
While there is widespread support for the HCPA, one cannot ignore the long
history of strong opposition to federal hate crimes legislation, which has resulted
in many failed attempts to enact a substantive federal hate crimes bill.7 There are
various doctrinal and pragmatic objections to such legislation, but opposition is
generally premised on two grounds. First, many critics question the utility of
punishing "hate crimes," and argue that existing criminal statutes are sufficient
without focusing on the underlying motivation of the crime.8 Second, critics have
questioned the propriety of the federal government's role in prosecuting these
crimes, and have argued that states, rather than the federal government, should be

5. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. E,
4701-4713, 123 Stat 2190 (enacting 18 U.S.C. §§ 249, 1389 (2006), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3716, 3716a (2009),
amending 18 U.S.C. § 249, enacting provisions set out as notes under 18 U.S.C. §249 and 42 U.S.C. § 3716, and
amending provisions set out as notes under 28 U.S.C. §§ 534, 994). The indictment of Kee's alleged attackers is
believed to be the first known application of the HCPA. See Elizabeth Piazza, Nazi branding lands in court,
THE DAILY TIMEs (Farmington, NM), Mar. 26, 2012, available at http://www.daily-times.com/ci_17988298.
6. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 249 of the Act was revised to provide that, "Whoever, whether or not acting under
color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any person or. through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual
or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person" may be subject to ten years imprisonment or a
maximum of life in prison if the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or
an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill. This Section includes a similar provision for
offenses perpetrated on victims because of their actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity or disability. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2006).
7. Senator Ted Kennedy was a continuous sponsor of such failed hate crimes bills. See, e.g., Local Law
Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007); Matthew Shepard Local Law
Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007); Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
1998, S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997).
8. See, e.g., Brian S. MacNamara, New York's Hate Crimes Act of 2000: Problematic and Redundant
LegislationAimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 519, 519-20 (2003) ("New York's Hate Crimes Act
is unnecessary and ill-advised. There is little or no credible evidence that bias-related crime is either prevalent or
deserving of specialized treatment. The criminal law that existed prior to the passage of the Hate Crimes Act
adequately addressed the anti-social behavior of defendants who commit crimes motivated by bias.").

§§
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responsible for determining whether or how to prosecute such cases. 9 Now that
Congress has passed the HCPA, these debates may continue, but policy makers
and law enforcement officials are faced with a new law and must refocus the
debate toward pragmatic strategies for implementing and enforcing the legislation.
The enactment of the HCPA provokes many questions regarding its implementation and effectiveness. What are the implications, real or perceived, of the federal
government's authority to prosecute hate crimes? Will the law cause federal courts
to be inundated with cases? Or, alternatively, is there a risk that federal hate crimes
legislation will be merely symbolic, with an implicit presumption that the federal
government will not actively enforce such a law?o While symbolic legislation
serves an expressive function in criminal law, there are notable deleterious effects
of symbolic laws that authorities choose not to enforce. Similarly, increased
federal intervention in shaping criminal justice priorities has long been controversial, and critics have labeled this trend the "overfederalization" of the criminal
law." For various reasons, critics of federal intervention in criminal justice
policies believe if hate crimes are to be punished, local and state governments
should retain full jurisdiction over these crimes.12
There is an extensive body of scholarship devoted to the concept of the symbolic
9. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1246 (2000) ("This would give federal officials a much greater influence on
state cases than they currently have. State and local authorities would, of course, be aware that their federal
counterparts could override any decision to decline to prosecute, to bring less serious charges, or to accept a plea
to a lesser offense by bringing federal charges.").
10. See, e.g., Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton's Crime ControlAgenda, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv.
67, 104-05 (1997) (arguing the inclusion of capital punishment in the 1994 crime bill was "purely symbolic"
because the death penalty had gone virtually unused in many years and the Brady Bill was a symbolic policy
expected to produce "no tangible changes in the national crime rate"); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning,
Lower CourtReadings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody
Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 369, 371 (2000) (noting opinions that the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which was later
held unconstitutional by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was a "purely symbolic" law meant to show
Congress was tough on crime).
11. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization,54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 753-54 (2005) (pointing out there are now over 4,000 federal crimes,
that more than forty percent of federal criminal provisions passed since the Civil War were enacted in the
twenty-eight year period between 1970 and 1998, and there was a thirty percent increase in federal offenses
carrying criminal penalties between 1980 and 2004); see also id. at 754 ("Federal law reaches at least some
instances of each of the following state offenses: theft, fraud, extortion, bribery, assault, domestic violence,
robbery, murder, weapons offenses, and drug offenses. In many instances, federal law overlaps almost completely
with state law, as is the case with drug offenses.") (quoting Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the ProperLimits for FederalCriminal Jurisdiction,46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995)
(citations omitted)).
12. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal "Hate
Crime" Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1191 (2000) (providing numerous reasons against the federalization of hate
crime legislation, including the issue of the state police powers remaining with the states); Christopher Chorba,
The Danger of FederalizingHate Crimes: CongressionalMisconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319 (2001) (arguing there is no evidence to support federal
intervention because states are responding sufficiently to hate crimes within their borders); Dan Hasenstab,
Is Hate a Form of Commerce? The Questionable Constitutionalityof Federal "Hate Crime" Legislation,
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politics of hate crimes legislation and to the "overfederalization of the criminal
law."' 3 Although I will briefly summarize these arguments, this Article does not
intend to contribute to the debate regarding the merits of hate crimes legislation or
the propriety of the federal government's jurisdiction to prosecute it. Instead, this
Article begins a new conversation about how the federal government should enforce and implement this legislation now that Congress, after carefully considering
these debates, has enacted the HCPA and President Obama has signed the bill into
law. The primary objective of this Article is to refocus the debate and discuss new
questions that should be considered in light of Congress's passage of a federal
hates crimes law. Despite the objections of critics, the federal government now has
the authority to prosecute hate crimes and attention must turn to examining the best
manner in which to enforce the law. The new dialogue should answer questions
about how the federal government might allocate its resources to maximize the
benefits for jurisdictions most in need of technical assistance or determining what
boundaries should exist between the federal government and states in prosecuting
and investigating hate crimes. Drawing upon principles of cooperative federalism,
this Article proposes a model that seeks to ensure the federal government's
authority to prosecute hate crimes under the HCPA is not merely symbolic, but is
implemented in a manner that respects the principles of federalism in the criminal
justice context.
The HCPA will require coordinated efforts on behalf of the federal government
and local law-enforcement agencies. However, ensuring a proper balance between
federal and local governments is an important constitutional tradition, and recognizing the each entities' role is particularly important in the realm of criminal
justice. 14 The local primacy of criminal justice issues is well-established, and the
overwhelming majority of crimes are prosecuted at the local level.' 5 All local
crimes, of course, do not warrant federal prosecution, but the nature of certain

45 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 973 (2001) (contending a lack of federal jurisdiction over hate crimes and states are better
suited to prosecute hate crimes because the federal government is constitutionally barred from participating).
13. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism,Federalization,and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REv.
789 (1996) (arguing the federalization of crime is unnecessary and creates a plethora of problems for the criminal
justice system); Robert J. Corry, Burn This Article: It Is Evidence in Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 TEX.
REv. L. & POL. 461 (2000) (denouncing hate crime legislation for its evidentiary and constitutional issues and
arguing this form of legislation punishes people's thoughts); David Goldberger, The Inherent Unfairnessof Hate
Crime Statutes, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 449 (2004) (suggesting hate crime sentence enhancements are inconsistent
with the purpose and supposed fairness of the criminal justice system).
14. Numerous scholars have debated the role of federalism in the context of criminal justice. See, e.g., Rachel
E. Barkow, Federalismand Criminal law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REv. 519
(2011) (noting the multijurisdictional nature of criminal law enforcement); see also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism,
Federalism,and PoliceMisconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 665 (2002) (noting "the defining characteristic of
American criminal law enforcement-the characteristic that most distinguishes it from law enforcement
elsewhere in the developed world-is its localism").
15. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence . .. has always been the province of the States . . . . Indeed, we can think of no better example of the

police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression
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criminal acts necessitates the intervention and oversight of the federal government.
The distinct harm associated with hate crimes, where perpetrators target their
victims based on race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, are the very types
of crimes that justify federal intervention.16 Hate crimes undermine the traditions
and values to which the United States has aspired and damages the national
character. This harm of hate crimes reverberates far beyond the direct victims and
the local communities in which they live. As President Bill Clinton poignantly
stated, "[Hate crimes] weaken the sense that we are one people with common
values and a common future. They tear us apart when we should be moving closer
together. They are acts of violence against America itself."' 7
Two incidents in the late 1990s offer disturbing illustrations of this "violence
against America." On June 7, 1998, in Jasper, Texas, three men beat James Byrd,
Jr., slit his throat, chained him to the back of a truck, and dragged him for several
miles before he died.' 8 Several months later, in Laramie, Wyoming, Matthew
Shepard's assailants beat him, chained him to a fence, and left him to die.' 9 Each of
these cases garnered national attention because many people perceived Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd. Jr. to be victims of hate crimes-James Byrd Jr.'s
assailants singled him out because he was African-American, and Matthew
Shepard's murderers killed him because he was homosexual. At the time of the
murders, neither Texas nor Wyoming had legislation specifically criminalizing the
motivation underlying the crime or providing a sentencing enhancement based
upon motivation for the crime. 2 0 Nor did any federal legislation exist that gave the
federal government the authority to prosecute the defendants because bias played a
role in their victim choice. 2 '

of violent crime and vindication of its victims."). Nearly ninety-five percent of crimes are tried at the local level.
See Barkow, supra note 14, at 554 n. 166 (citation omitted).
16. For example, the Department of Justice defines hate crimes as "offenses motivated by hatred against a
victim based on his or her race, religion, sexual orientation, handicap, ethnicity, or national origin." See generally
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, A POLICYMAKER's GUIDE In HATE CRIMES (Mar. 1997),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/162304.pdf.
17. William J. Clinton, Radio Address on Hate Crime (radio broadcast June 7, 1997), quoted in Kristine Olson,
The Government and the Community: A CoordinatedResponse to Hate Crime in America, 45-Oct FED. LAw. 47,
47(1998).
18. See Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged in Possible Racial Killing, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10,
1998, at A16; Mitch Mitchell, Dragging Death: Texas Faces Troubling Race Issues, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 11,
1998, at 4A; Second Man on Death Row in Draggingof Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at A14.
19. James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; Two are Charged,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1998, at A9.
20. Prompted by the Byrd murder, in 2001, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law The James Byrd Jr.
Hate Crimes Act., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. Art. 42.014 (West 2010).
21. Commentators often refer to the crimes against these two men as hate crimes. See, e.g., Kevin Galvin,
Clinton Pushing Expansion ofLawsAgainst Hate Crimes, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Apr. 6, 1999, at 1B; Charisse Jones,
Gay Students Brutal Death Stokes Hate Crime Debate, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 1998, at 1A; Rick Lyman, Hate
Laws Don't Matter Except When They Do, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1998, § 4, at 6.
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Although these cases received substantial media attention, they certainly were
not among the first bias-related crimes to occur following the Civil Rights
Movement.22 Hate crimes, or bias-related crimes,2 3 continue to occur with disturbing regularity in the United States.24 Similarly, in the years following these
murders, the September 11, 2001 attacks generated widespread attacks on Muslims. 2 5 Recently, anti-immigrant sentiments have caused concerns among LatinoAmericans that they will be victims of bias-related crimes. 2 6 Effectively addressing hate crimes will require a multijurisdictional approach to educate and equip a
spectrum of people involved in law-enforcement, including the police who
investigate these crimes and the state and federal prosecutors who ultimately
decide whether to charge such crimes as hate crimes.
This Article posits the structural provisions contained within the HCPA, the
Department of Justice's ("DOJ") internal prosecutorial polices, and the realities of
limited federal resources ensure individual states will be the primary authority to
prosecute hate crimes. Thus, like most federal criminal statutes, the legislation is
largely symbolic. The federal government may not pursue prosecutions in states
that already have comprehensive legislation analogous to the HCPA, even if these

22. See, e.g., Leslie Berger, Police Assign Detective to Simi 's Rising 'Hate Crimes,'L.A.TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1989,
at J4 (explaining that in response to a significant increase in bias motivated attacks, the police were specifically
assigned a detective to investigate such crimes); Avowed Racist Gets Life Sentences in Sniper Killings of 2 Utah
Joggers, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1981, at BIO (discussing the trial and sentencing of Joseph P. Franklin who
attacked an African-American prosecutor during his trial for the racially-motivated fatal shootings of two men the
previous year).
23. There are various definitions for hate crimes, or bias crimes, but the definitions are fairly consistent. A hate
crime or bias crime has been defined as "a crime in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the
case of a property crime, the property that is the object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person." Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
24. In 2008, 13,690 law enforcement agencies submitted hate crime data to the Uniform Crime Reports
program. Of these agencies, 2,145 reported 7,783 hate crime incidents involving 9,168 offenses. Of these
offenses, 51.4% related to racial bias crimes and 17.7% were motivated by sexual orientation bias. FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
ucr.htm.
25. The FBI's 2001 Uniform Crime Report indicated that while there were 28 reported anti-Islamic hate crimes
in 2000, the numbers jumped in 2001. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT FOR THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2001), availableat http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. "Anti-Islamic religion incidents were previously
the second least reported, but in 2001, they became the second highest reported among religious-bias incidents ...
growing by more than 1,600 percent over the 2000 volume. In 2001, reported data showed there were 481
incidents made up of 546 offenses having 554 victims of crimes motivated by bias toward the Islamic religion."
Id.
26. See, e.g., Virginia Martinez, Jazmin Garcia & Jasmine Vasquez, A Community UnderSiege: The Impact of
Anti-Immigrant Hysteria on Latinos, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 101 (2008) (discussing increases in anti-Hispanic
hate crimes); Charles M. Blow, Rogues, Robes and Racists, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at A19 (discussing
harassment of Latinos by racist extremist groups and the increase in anti-Hispanic hate crimes); Extremists
Declare 'Open Season'on Immigrants: Hispanics Target of Incitement and Violence, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
http://www.adl.org/mainExtremismlimmigration-extremists.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2013); Hate CrimesAgainst
Latinos At New Record Levels: FBI Data Document Continued Disturbing and Violent Trend, MALDEF.org
(Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/hatecrimes_102808/index.html.
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crimes are not vigorously prosecuted at the state level.2 7 Although hate crimes
deserve a symbolic denunciation from the federal government, the federal government may be forced to play a more active, functional role in certain circumstances.
For example, although many states have some form of hate crimes legislation,
there may be instances in which the state declines to prosecute and where the
federal government may need to intervene. Similarly, although many states have
some form of hate crimes legislation, many states have not enacted legislation
covering the additional categories of victims now protected under the federal
legislation. Furthermore, there are several states that still have no hate crimes
legislation at all. 28
Thus, mere symbolism, without more, is not adequate to address the crimes the
HCPA seeks to cover, and undermines the spirit of the law. This Article argues the
federal government can and should fill a significant void, and the symbolic nature
of the HCPA will need to be supplemented with a functional model allowing
federal-state cooperation within the context of prosecuting hate crimes. Through
the lens of cooperative federalism, a concept that emphasizes state and federal
collaborative partnerships to address societal issues, this Article contemplates a
model for federal-state collaboration in the context of prosecuting hate crimes
under the HCPA.2 9
Part I briefly describes the history of federal legislation aimed at addressing hate
crimes. This Part contextualizes the HCPA and explains the significance of the
expanded authority this legislation confers upon the federal government to
prosecute hate crimes. It examines the primary critiques of federal intervention in
the context of hate crimes. First, it challenges the critique that the HCPA's
enactment continues a trend of overfederalization in the criminal justice context
and therefore violates principles of federalism. Second, it examines the dangers
associated with symbolic federal legislation and specifically analyzes the negative
impact of failing to enforce hate crimes legislation.
Part II asserts that while the expressive function the HCPA serves is valuable,
and should not be understated, the new law's inherent symbolism should be
supplemented with a functional model of federal-state collaboration in the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. To this end, Part II proposes a model for

27. Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1541, 1543 (2002)
(explaining that most federal criminal statutes are symbolic, "feel good" enactments).
28. Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming do not have criminal statutes covering
bias-motivated violence or intimidation. See State Laws, USLEGAL, INC. (Oct. 15, 2012, 8:43 PM), http://
hatecrimes.uslegal.com/state-laws/.
29. "Cooperative Federalism" is a term describing the symbiotic relationship between the states and the
national government. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IowA L. REv. 243,
284 (2005); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The GreenAspects ofPrintz: The Revival ofFederalismand its
Implicationsfor Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 573, 578 (1998) (describing cooperative federalism
as a process in which "states take primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the
freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.").
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effective state-federal collaboration in the prosecution of hate crimes that draws
upon the principles of cooperative federalism, a concept that encourages federalstate partnerships.
The Act contemplates a level of cooperation between state and federal law
enforcement in the prosecution of hate crimes, and also provides that local
jurisdictions will receive federal money to assist in their prosecution. However, the
implementation of this law requires refinement and careful thinking about how the
federal-state relationship will be maintained. Thus, Part III suggests several ways
to address the federalism concerns and encourage states and local governments to
develop and enforce their own measures to address hate crimes including the
creation of a federal-state hate crimes task force, allowing state prosecutors to
prosecute crimes in federal court, and placing federal "ombudsmen" in state
offices. Part IV concludes by exploring some of the challenges related to the
proposal and identifies issues for future consideration.
I.

CONTEXTUALIZING THE MATCHEW-SHEPARD-JAMEs BYRD, JR.
HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT

A full understanding of the impact of the HCPA and an analysis of its position
within a cooperative federalism framework requires a brief history of the preexisting federal hate crime legislation. A review of the previous legislation aimed
at hate crimes reveals the deficiencies of that legislation to address important
concerns and demonstrates the need for the HCPA to fill important gaps in the law.
However, because the federal government has never had the authority to prosecute
as broad a spectrum of crimes as the HCPA allows, special consideration should be
given to the federal government's enforcement strategy.
A. The Prevalenceof Hate Crimes in the United States
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") Uniform Crime Reporting
Program ("UCR") represents the most comprehensive data on hate crimes.30 Since
1991, the FBI has documented more than 113,000 hate crimes. 3 1 Local lawenforcement agencies voluntarily report information used to determine national
hate crimes statistics, but not all local law enforcement agencies participate in the
UCR Program. Therefore the number of bias-motivated crimes is difficult to
estimate and existing data are probably under-inclusive.3 2 In 1999 there were

30. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: HATE CRIMES STATISTIcs, available at

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr#hate.
3 1. See id.
32. In 2006, Senator Ted Kennedy noted the difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics regarding hate crimes,
noting "[t]he upward trend in the number of hate crimes may be the tip of the iceberg since many state and local
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6,189 bias-motivated crimes against persons reported in the United States."
By 2009, this number had declined from 6,189 to 4,793, with a high of 7,768
in 2001 and a low of 4,793 in 2009." Despite this overall decline, hate crimes
motivated by bias against the victim's sexual orientation remained almost constant
from 1,058 in 1999 to 1,052 in 2009, with a high of 1,168 in 2008 and a low of 818
in 2005. Nevertheless, crimes against victims based upon their sexual orientation
as a percentage of total bias-motivated crimes have increased from 17.1 percent in
1999 to 21.9 percent in 2009." It is also important to note UCR data does not
include hate crimes based upon bias against transgendered individuals. Thus, it
likely underestimates the total number of LGBT bias-motivated crimes.
The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs also reported independent
statistics of incidents of hate violence for 2009.37 This report defines anti-lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgendered, queer (LGBTQ) hate violence as "any act that an
offender commits against a person or a person's property because of the offender's
bias towards or hatred for that person's actual or perceived sexual orientation
and/or gender identity and expression."3 Although this data does not explicitly
track the "bias-motivation" of each incident, the incident must have been motivated by one's actual or perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity. 39
This group reported 2,181 victims and survivors of hate violence in 2009.40
Gender identity was reported for 1,983 of those victims, and of those 1,983, fifteen
percent were transgender, gender queer, or intersex which is approximately 297
individuals. 41 The report also notes that twenty-two anti-LGBT murders were
committed in 2009, a number that, since reporting commenced, is second only to
approximately twenty-nine murders committed in 1999 and 2008.42

jurisdictions don't participate in the data collection." Senator Kennedy Speaks on FBI Release of 2006 Hate
Crimes Statistics, U.S. FED. NEws, Nov. 19, 2007.
33. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: HATE CRIMES STATISTICS FOR 1999-2009,

availableat http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr#hate.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Methodology, UNIFORM CRIME REPORr HATE CRIMES STATIsTIcs 2009,

http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/documents/methodology.pdf. Section 4708 of the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2009 amends the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 to include the
collection of data for crimes motivated by "gender and gender identity" as well as "data about crimes committed
by, and crimes directed against, juveniles." However, those data are not yet available for publication.
37. See NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER AND QUEER COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2009 (2010), http://www.avp.org/
documents/NCAVP2009HateViolenceReportforWeb.pdf.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 29-30.
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B. Hate Crimes Legislation State-by-State
Prior to the passage of the HCPA, existing federal hate crimes legislation
contained stringent jurisdictional limitations. There was no federal statute that
expressly prohibited bias-motivated crimes in which the victim was not participating in a federally protected activity. 4 3 Currently, many states have legislation
providing for penalty enhancements for those who perpetrate hate crimes. The
enactment of these laws is rooted in the early 1970s, when the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL") noted a rise in anti-Semitism and began to advocate for hate
crimes legislation at the state level." The ADL developed a model hate crimes
statute, and many states based their laws upon it.4 5 Nevertheless, these laws vary
considerably across the states, and the lack of a comprehensive federal statute has
resulted in a "patchwork of inconsistent, contradictory laws."46
Forty-five of the fifty states have protections against bias-motivated crimes
targeting victims in the following categories: race/color, national origin/ethnicity,
and religion/creed.4 7 Several states such as Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, South

43. See discussion infra note 97.
44. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence?
Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas ofEthnic Intimidation Law, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333, 339 (1991).
45. See Martha Shaffer, Criminal Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: Is Bill C-41 Tough Enough?,
41 McGILL L.J. 199, 205-06 (1995) (stating the ADL model statute did not originally contain a provision
including crimes committed because of a victim's sexual orientation, but the ADL has since broadened its model
statute to include crimes against members of this group).
46. Helia Garrido Hull, The Not-So-Golden Years: Why Hate Crime Legislation is Failinga VulnerableAging
Population,2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 387,400 (2009).
47. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (1994); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.03,
302, 422.55-.56, 422.7, 422.75-.76,423.2, 594.3, 3053.4, 11411, 13023, 13519.6 (West 2011); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-21-106.5, 18-9-121 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4a-2c, 46a-54, 46a-58, 51-279d,
52-251b, 52-571c, 53-37a, 53a-40a, 53a-181j-1 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (West 1995)
(amended 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.085, 806.13 (West 1974), 876.17, 876.20, 877.19 (West 1989) (amended
2002); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 711-1107, 846-51, 846-52-54 (West 2001) (amended 2002); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 18-7902,7903 (West 1983); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 4070/5, 4070/10, 4070/15, 4070/20, 2605/2605-390
(West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. 10-13-3-1 (West 2003), 10-13-3-38 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692.15,712.9,
716.6A, 716.8, 729A.2, 729A.4-.5 (West 2011); Ky. REv. STxr. ANN. §§ 346.055, 525.110, 532.031 (West 2000);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:107.2, 15:1204.4 (West 1997) (amended 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 507,
1151 (West 2005); MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. LAw §§ 10-301-307 (West 2005) (amended 2009), MD. CODE. ANN.
Pus. SAFETY § 2-307 (West 2003) (amended 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6 § 116B (West 1990) (amended
2002), ch. 22C §§ 32-35, ch. 265 §39, ch. 266 §§ 98, 127A-127B (West 2003) (amended 2012); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §750.147b (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2231, 611A.79 (West 2011); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 97-17-39, 97-35-17, 99-19-301, 99-19-303, 99-19-305, 99-19-307 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 557.035,
537.523 (West 1999); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-221-222 (West 1989) (amended 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28-110-115 (West 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § §193.1675, 207.185 (West 1995) (amended 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:53A-21, 2A:53A-23, 2C: 16-1, 2C:33-9 (West 2001) (amended 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18B-2,
31-18B-3, 31-18B-5 (West 2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 40-c (McKinney 2003), N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837
(McKinney 2010), N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 485.05,485.10 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 114-3, 14-12.7,
14-12.12, 14-144, 14-199, 99D-1 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 12.1-14-04-05 (West 1973); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2307.70, 2927.11-12 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 850, 915, 1765 (West 2001);
OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 166.075, 166.155, 166.165 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3307, 8309 (West
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-1-35, 11-44-31, 42-28.2-8.1 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-1
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Carolina, and Utah have no protections specifically for seven major categories of
protected victims including: (1) race/color; (2) national origin/ethnicity; (3) sex;
(4) sexual orientation; (5) gender identity; (6) religion/creed; and (7) physical or
mental disability.4 8 Arizona and Arkansas only prohibits bias-motivated crimes
against religious property. 4 9 Georgia protects against bias-motivated crime against
religious property, as well as prohibits cross burning, the use of masks or hoods to
conceal identity, and terroristic threats and acts.5 0 Utah similarly protects against
terroristic threats or acts, but as an aggravating sentencing enhancement. 5 ' South
Carolina only protects against bias-motivated crime intended to prohibit the free
exercise of religion. 52
Sexual orientation is a protected category in thirty-one states,53 gender in
twenty-three states,54 and physical and mental disability in twenty-seven states.

(West 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 1455-1457 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57, 52-8.5 (West 2011);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (West 1993); W.V. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-20, 61-6-13 (West 1998); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §939.645 (West 2012); WYo. STAT. ANN. §6-9-102 (West 1982).
48. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1604 (West 1981) (amended 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-207 (West 2007);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-26, 16-11-37, 16-11-38 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-520 (West 1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-203.3-.4. (West 2007).
49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1604 (West 1981) (amended 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §5-71-207 (West 2007).
50. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-26 (West 2012), 16-11-37 (West 2010), 16-11-38 (West 1968).
51. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-203.3-.4. (West 2007).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-520 (West 1962).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §46a-58 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (West 1995) (amended 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.085 (West 1989) (amended 2010); HAw. REV. STAT. §846-51 (West 2001); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 4070/5 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. 10-13-3-1 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1992); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §532.031 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (West 1997) (amended 2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A §507 (West 1975); MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-301-307 (West 2005) (amended 2009);
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C §§ 32-35 (West 1991) (amended 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2231, 611A.79
(West 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 557.035 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-110-115 (West 1997); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.1675, 207.185 (West 1995) (amended 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 16-1 (West 2001)
(amended 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-2 (West 2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §40-c (McKinney 2003), N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 485.05 (McKinney 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.075, 166.155, 166.165 (West 2012); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-38 (West 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1455 (West 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645
(West 2012).
54. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE §422.55 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-58 (West 2005); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §4070/5 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 14:107.2 (West

1997) (amended 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 507 (West

1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2231, 611A.79 (West 2011);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-301, 99-19-305 (West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 (West 1999); NEB. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-110-115 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 16-1 (West 2001) (amended 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-18B-2 (West 2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 40-c (McKinney 2003), N.Y. PENAL LAw § 485.05 (McKinney
2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.075, 166.155, 166.165 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-38 (West
1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1455 (West 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (West 1993); W.V. CODE
ANN. §5-11-20 (West 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-102 (West 1982).
55. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (1994); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE §422.55
(West 2005); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46a-58 (West 2005); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (West 1995) (amended 1997); FLA. STAr. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1989) (amended 2010);
HAW. REv. STAT. §846-51 (West 2001); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §4070/5 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. 10-13-3-1

1876

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1863

Only nine states protect victims of gender identity motivated crimes. 6 While some
states offer additional protections for victims in certain categories, including
advanced age and homelessness, few offer as many additional protections as the
District of Columbia. The District of Columbia provides perhaps the broadest
protections offering protection in all the seven major categories, as well as for
marital status, age, personal appearance, family responsibility, homelessness,
matriculation, or political affiliation.
C. Pre-ExistingFederalHate Crimes Legislation
Prior to the enactment of the HCPA, there were several federal statutes aimed at
addressing bias-motivated violence, including the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, and the Hate
Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act. These laws, individually and collectively,
failed to offer the broad protections that the HCPA currently offers.
1. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
Perhaps the earliest legislation aimed at addressing bias-motivated violence was
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,58 which Congress enacted in response to
widespread violence against recently freed African Americans in the South during
Reconstruction. 59 The Ku Klux Klan Act, which is a precursor to the modem
version of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, made it a federal crime whenever "two or more
persons within the limits of any State, band or conspire together to do any act in
violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person ... which ...
would ... under any law of the United States ... constitute the crime of either
murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation

(West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (West 1997) (amended
2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 1151 (West 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C §§ 32-35 (West 1991)
(amended 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2231, 61 1A.79 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 (West 1999);
NEB. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-110-115 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.1675, 207.185 (West 1995)
(amended 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 16-1 (West 2001) (amended 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-2 (West
2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 2003), N.Y. PENAL LAw § 485.05 (McKinney 2010); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 §850 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-38 (West 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1455 (West
1999); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (West 1993); W.V. CODE ANN. §5-11-20 (West 1998); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §939.645 (West 2012).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55-56 (West 2005); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 2005); HAW. REV.
STAr. § 846-51 (West 2001); MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. LAw §§ 10-301-304 (West 2005) (amended 2009); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 557.035 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 16-1 (West 2001) (amended 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-18B-2 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1455 (West 1999).
57. D.C. CODE §§ 22-3701, 22-3702, 22-3703, 3704 (West 2009).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (providing criminal sanctions and a civil damages action for conspiracy to commit
various offenses under Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act).
59. Ken Gormley, Private Conspiraciesand the Constitution:A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3),
64 TEx. L. REv. 527, 536-37 (1985).
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of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance ....
Many observers viewed the original text of the Ku Klux Klan Act as so
expansive, that "virtually every backyard conspiracy between two individuals
would be a violation of federal law," rather than those conspiracies to related to
inflict racial violence upon newly freed African Americans. 6 ' Congress subsequently amended the legislation to "confine the authority of this law to the
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the rights of American citizens." 6 2
The new law, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), provided civil and criminal
penalties that were aimed at addressing the types of conspiratorial violence
generally practiced by the Ku Klux Klan. Because states and local jurisdictions
had unsuccessfully dealt with violence caused by Klan members, the law was
intended to grant federal authorities the power to protect Fourteenth Amendment
rights that states had failed to protect. The law faced numerous challenges, and in
1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that the privileges and immunities
granted to state citizens and U.S. citizens are different, such that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee federal rights to state citizens. The Supreme Court
further diluted the power of the Act in 1883 when it struck down the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, holding that Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment did
not cover action by private individuals, and was limited to state actions.6
After nearly a century-long period of dormancy for the Ku Klux Klan Act, in
1971 the Supreme Court decided Griffin v. Breckenridge and held § 1985(3)
reaches private conspiracies and that there could be "no doubts" as to its
constitutionality.6 5 To ensure the Act would be used to address only the types of
crimes committed by the Ku Klux Klan following Reconstruction, the Court
developed a four-part test to make a prima facie case under the statute: There
(1) must be a conspiracy; (2) the conspiracy must be for the purpose of depriving a
person or class of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities under the
law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) a person must be injured in
his person or property or deprived of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.66 At present, although 42 U.S.C. § 1985 may be used to prosecute a limited
range of private conspiracies, some commentators have observed that the Court's

60. FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT'S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTrrU-

TIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 101 (2000) (citing CONG. GLOBE., 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. 493-94 (1871) (quoting House
Committee Bill)).
61. Id. at 537.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. app. 478 (1871) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger).
63. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1872); see also Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REv. 981, 985-86 (2002).
64. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883) ("[lIt is not individual offences, but abrogation and denial of
rights ... for which it clothes the Congress with power to provide a remedy.").
65. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971).
66. See id. at 103.
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restrictive rulings have eviscerated the Ku Klux Klan Act, "prevent[ing] Congress
from accomplishing ... what it intended."6 7
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1968
Congress passed what has been called the first "modem" federal hate-crime
legislation as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.68 This legislation was
introduced to "strengthen the capability of the Federal Government to meet the
problem of violent interference, for racial or other discriminatory reasons, with a
person's free exercise of civil rights." 6 9 The Senate report regarding this legislation
explained that crimes had been committed not only against African Americans
struggling to exercise their federal rights, but also against members of other races
who aided in that fight.70 Now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 245, the statute grants the
federal government jurisdiction and operates by identifying two categories of
victims: (1) identification with a protected class and (2) the activity engaged in by
the member of the protected class. Protected classes are characterized by race,
color, religion, or national origin. Protected activities include enrolling in or
attending any public school or public college, participating in benefits, services,
facilities or activities provided or administered by any State; applying for or
enjoying employment, or joining or using the services or advantages of any labor
organization, hiring hall, or employment agency; jury participation; traveling in or
using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or facility
of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air; and enjoying goods or services
at public accommodations.7 2
To prosecute a defendant under § 245, the defendant must have chosen the
victim because of his or her membership in a protected class and also because of
his or her engagement in one of the second categories of protected activities. To
counter the argument that the legislation was an infringement on the state's
traditional primacy over criminal law, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 emphasized the
importance of interference with "distinctly" federal rights.74 If a defendant is
guilty of violating the statute, but the victim sustained no bodily injury, the

67. Beermann, supra note 63, at 1020.
68. Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: ConstitutionalLaw Chapter: Hate Crime Regulation
and Challenges, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 279, 281 (David Hong ed., 2009 [hereinafter Annual Review])
(distinguishing the Civil Rights Act of 1968 from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871); Jeannine Bell, Hate Thy
Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the Persistenceof Segregation,5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 47, 57 (2007).
69. S. REP. No. 90-721, at 1838 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Report] reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837-38.
70. Id. at 1839 ("Acts of racial terrorism have sometimes gone unpunished and have too often deterred the free
exercise of constitutional and statutory rights.").
7 1. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006).
73. Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Note, Splitting the Atom or Splitting Hairs-theHate Crimes
PreventionAct of1999, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 931, 954 (1999).
74. For example, Congress' rationale for including this dual requirement can be traced to the sentiment that
when an African American "is assaulted for attending a desegregated school or casting a ballot, it is not only the
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defendant can be fined or imprisoned for up to one year, or if weapons were used,
imprisoned up to ten years. However, if the crime results in the death of a person,
or involves kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, or attempts at either, the crime
may result in fines, imprisonment for any number of years or for life, or capital
punishment.
In 1999, Eric Holder, Jr., then acting in his capacity as Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, noted several deficiencies in § 245. For instance, he described
§ 245's jurisdictional hurdle as difficult to overcome.7 6 The requirement that the
victim of the crime not only be harmed while engaged in one of the federally
protected activities, but because she was engaged in the federally protected
activities, presents a high bar for prosecutors. 7 Furthermore, Holder and other
critics have noted the statute fails to protect victims who are harmed because of
their gender, disability, or sexual orientation.
Describing the shortcomings of the statute, Senator Kennedy remarked, "[Tihe
principal federal hate crimes law . .. contains anachronistic and onerous jurisdictional requirements that frequently make it impossible for federal officials to
prosecute flagrant acts of racial or religious violence" and "[§] 245 does not cover
[crimes against those targeted because of their sexual orientation], gendermotivated violence, or hate crimes against the disabled."79
Despite these jurisdictional limitations, in the year preceding the enactment of
the HCPA, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ recorded an increase in hate
crimes prosecutions. For example, in 2009, the Civil Rights Division charged
forty-three defendants in nineteen hate crimes cases.so In the last quarter of 2009
alone, there were various activities including filings, sentencings, and guilty pleas
in thirteen hate crime cases subject to the DOJ's jurisdiction. 8 ' This number was
more than the total number of cases filed in fiscal years 2006 or 2007.2
Nevertheless, because of the shortcomings of § 245, significant gaps existed in the
federal government's ability to address hate crimes.

individual ... and the peace and dignity of the State that is injured." Senate Report, supra note 69, at 1840. Such
acts were considered "distinctly Federal crimes." Id.
75. Annual Review, supra note 68.
76. Hate Crimes PreventionAct of 1998: Hearing on S. 1529 before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 5 (1998), [hereinafter Holder Testimony] (testimony of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y General), 1998
WL 385267.
77. Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 73, at 954-55.
78. Id.; see also Holder Testimony, supra note 76, at 5.
79. 143 CONG. REC. S12576-02 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), 1997 WL 712518.
80. United States Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 1Ith Cong.,
9 (2010) [hereinafter Justice Department Hearing] (testimony of Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y Gen.),
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear 100513_1.html.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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3. Hate Crimes StatisticsAct of 1990
The Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 ("HCSA") represents another federal
law used to address hate crimes. The primary purpose of the HCSA is to collect
statistics regarding the prevalence of such crimes. Following a series of bills
regarding hate crime statistics tracking 84 that failed to pass the Senate after they
passed the House, H.R. 1048, the HCSA, was passed in the House on June 27,
1989.85 The bill instructed the Attorney General to acquire data about crimes
"manifest[ing] evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity," and defined sexual orientation as "consensual homosexuality or hetero-

sexuality." 86
Despite a favorable report from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill sparked
a controversy in the Senate surrounding gay rights, and ultimately the bill was
passed only after it was amended to include a provision stating "the American
family life is the foundation of American Society .... Nothing in [the] Act shall be
construed ... to promote or encourage homosexuality."8 7 The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 is also designed to help localities appropriately recognize and
respond to hate crimes by "increas[ing] law enforcement's awareness of and
sensitivity to [the criminal acts]."8 8 However, its real value has been described as
highlighting the need for hate crime statistics reform and increased awareness of
hate crimes among law enforcement officials.8 9
Although the HCSA was "groundbreaking" because of its inclusion of violence
against gays and lesbians as a category of hate crimes for which information may

83. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, H.R. Res. 1048, 101st Cong. (1989) (enacted).
84. Joseph M. Fernandez, Recent Developments, BringingHate Crime into Focus-The Hate Crime Statistics
Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-275,26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 261,270-75 (1991).
85. Id. at 276. Representative Barbara Kennelly introduced H.R. 1171 to the House in 1985, stating "a series of
arsons of synagogues in [her] congressional district . .. drew [her] attention to [the hate crime] problem." Id. at
269. H.R. 1171 and H.R. 775, each designed to encourage gathering statistics regarding crimes driven by
prejudices against races, religions, and ethnicities, were bolstered by the support of organizations such as the
Anti-Defamation League, the International Network of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, the Anti-Klan Network and
the Institute for the Prevention and Control of Violence and Extremism. Id. at 269-70. However, although the bills
passed the House without trouble, they failed to pass the Senate that year. Id. In 1986, another bill was introduced
and passed in the House, again failing to pass through the Senate before it adjourned for the year. Id.
86. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, H.R. Res. 1048, 101st Cong. (1989) (enacted). The inclusion of sexual
orientation as a category of criminal motivations to be monitored was one of the manners in which this bill varied
from other versions that preceded it. Fernandez, supranote 84, at 272.
87. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 534 (2006)); see Fernandez, supra note 84, at 276 (detailing the legislative history of the HCSA).
88. James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A CriticalPerspective,22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 8 (1997).
89. See Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: a Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 165, 171
(1993) (noting "bias crime problems" in increasing numbers of jurisdictions and discussing the effect of the
passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act); see also Fernandez, supra note 84, at 281 ("The primary utility of
the Act lies in the compilation of data for state and local crime-control resource allocation purposes and in the
attendant effects of focusing the state and local law enforcement machine ... on crafting an effective incident-byincident response to bias crime.").
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be gathered, the implementation of the HCSA has faced challenges. First, law
enforcement officers frequently fail to properly identify crimes as hate crimes.9 0
Similarly, victims may be reluctant to identify prejudice-related aspects of a crime,
and record keepers "generally are unaware of prejudices in their communities." 9'
Additionally, reporting hate crimes under the Hate Crime Statistics Act is voluntary; many jurisdictions do not issue reports including these statistics.92 Finally,
although the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 includes sexual orientation and
disability in the definition of a hate crime, the federal government cannot prosecute
a hate crime motivated by these factors, and gender motivated violence is not
identified as a category of hate crime for statistical purposes.9 3
4. Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act
In 1994, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act
("HCSEA"). 9 4 The HCSEA institutes enhanced penalties for defendants prosecuted for bias-related crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 245.95 The HCSEA defines hate
crimes as crimes in which "the defendant intentionally selects a victim because of
the victim's actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation."9 6 The HCSEA required the United States
Sentencing Commission "to promulgate 'guidelines to provide sentencing enhancements of not less than [three] offense levels for ... hate crimes.' 9 7
The HCSEA works in conjunction with the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and is
subject to the same limitations. Eligibility for enhanced sentencing is premised
upon the defendant having chosen her victim because of the victim's race, color,
religion, or national origin, but also because the victim was engaging in one of the
federally protected activities. Furthermore, if a victim was attacked because of her
sexual orientation, gender, or disability, § 245 did not apply, and there was no
penalty enhancement available for a defendant who chose her victim based on
sexual orientation or gender identity.9 8

90. See Fernandez, supra note 84, at 281-82 (discussing potential implementation problems surrounding the
Hate Crime Statistics Act).
91. Levin, supra note 89, at 172, Edward M. Kennedy, Hate Crimes The Unfinished Business ofAmerica,
44 Bos. BAR J. 6, 21-22 (2000).
92. Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads,73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
564, 594-95 (1998).
93. Kennedy, supra note 91, at 22.
94. Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in part at
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006) note).
95. Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 73, at 937.
96. Id. at 958.
97. Id. at 957-58 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006)). In 1995, the Sentencing Commission implemented a
three-level offense increase for hate crimes. Id. at 958.
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2006).

1882

AMERICAN.CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1863

D. Contextualizing the Matthew Shepard-JamesByrd, Jr
Hate Crimes Prevention Act
Recognizing the limitations of existing hate crimes legislation, advocates
continued to push for more comprehensive federal legislation. These efforts
culminated in the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Act ("HCPA"),
commonly known as the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime
Prevention Act.9 9 The following subsections discuss two important characteristics
of this new legislation-(1) the federal government's enhanced role in prosecuting
hate crimes and (2) the provision of federal dollars to address bias-related
violence.
1. The HCPA: FederalJurisdictionto Prosecute Hate Crimes
The HCPA was introduced as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and President Obama signed the Act into law on
October 28, 2009. '" The HCPA makes it a federal crime to assault or attempt to
assault an individual because of his or her actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.'o' Designed
primarily to "address two serious limitations in the reach of the current Federal
hate crimes statutes," this legislation represents a significant expansion of federal
authority.' 0 2 First, as discussed above, prosecution under the pre-existing legislation aimed at bias-related crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 245, required that the victim was
engaging in one of six protected activities during the offense.10 3 Section 245
required a victim not only be engaged in one of the protected activities, but also
that the defendant chose the victim because of the victim's participation in one of

99. See id.
100. See Remarks on the Enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention
Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 859 (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900859.pdf.
101. Specifically, § 249(a)(1) of the Act provides that, "Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law ...
willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an
explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, or national origin of any person" may be subject to ten years imprisonment or a maximum of
life in prison if the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to
commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill. Section 249(a)(2) includes a similar provision for offenses
perpetrated on victims because of their actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity or disability. 18 U.S.C.A. § 249 (West 2009).
102. H.R. REP. No. 111-86, at 5 (2009).
103. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §245 made it unlawful to willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with any person
or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force, because of that other person's race, color, religion or national origin
and because his/her activity as a (1) student or applicant for admission to a public school or college; (2) an
applicant for private or state employment; (3) a private or state employee, a member or applicant for membership
in a labor organization, or applicant for employment through an employment agency, labor organization or hiring
hall; (4) a juror or prospective juror in state court ; (5) a traveler or user of a facility of interstate commerce or
common carrier; or (6) a patron of public accommodation or place of exhibition or entertainment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 245(b)(2)(A)-(F) (2006).
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the activities. This criterion greatly limited the circumstances in which the federal
government could prosecute the perpetrator.' 0 Furthermore, in addition to this
high evidentiary bar, § 245 did not apply to crimes where the bias-related reason
was gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity, and thus left large numbers of
groups unprotected.' 0 5 The inclusion of these characteristics in the Matthew
Shepard Act expands the classes of people protected, and represents a significant
expansion of federal authority.10 6
It is important to note the HCPA does not automatically confer jurisdiction to the
United States to prosecute hate crimes. The federal government may intervene
only after the DOJ meets the certification requirements set forth in the legislation.
Pursuant to this process, the DOJ may assume jurisdiction in one of following
circumstances: (1) the state in which the hate crime occurred does not have
jurisdiction; (2) the state has asked the federal government to assume jurisdiction;
(3) a state prosecution has failed to vindicate the federal interest against hatemotivated violence; or (4) a federal prosecution is in the public interest and
necessary to secure substantial justice. 07
2. The HCPA: Provision of FederalFunding to Address Hate Crimes
In addition to granting the DOJ jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
bias-motivated violence, the Act provides financial and other resources to assist
local and state jurisdictions to prosecute hate crimes. Specifically, the Act authorizes the Attorney General to: (1) provide state, local, or tribal law enforcement
agencies with technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or other assistance in the investigation or prosecution of violent crimes and hate crimes; and (2) awards grants to
assist such agencies with the extraordinary expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. 0 8 The HCPA provides $5 million per year in
funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to help state and local agencies pay for
investigating and prosecuting hate crimes.' 0 9

104. Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 73, at 954.
105. The Shepard-Byrd Act expanded federal hate crimes law to cover crimes motivated by the victim's sexual
orientation or actual or perceived gender or gender identity, and eliminated the requirement that the victim be
engaged in a federally protected activity. For discussion of these changes, see generally Katherine A. Womack,
Please Check One-Male or Female?: Confronting Gender Identity Discrimination in Collegiate Residential
Life, 44 U. RicH. L. REv. 1365 (2010), and Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 1115 (2010).
106. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Columbia University School of Law Commencement
(May 14, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100514.html ("[T]here was not
a single line in nearly 225 years of U.S. Code that referred explicitly to gender identity. Today, the Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd Act-which the President signed into law last October--does just that, finally protecting
our Nation's gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered citizens from vicious hate crimes.").
107. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835,
§ 4707 (a) (2009) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2006)).
108. Id. §§ 4704-4706.
109. Id. §4704(b)(7).
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This provision of funding and other resources undoubtedly seeks to address the
financial burdens local jurisdictions experience with prosecuting hate crimes. In a
November 11, 1999 letter to Speaker Dennis Hastert, Sheriff James Pond and
detective Sergeant DeBree of the Albany County (Wyoming) Sheriff's Department
provided a striking example of the detrimental impact a difficult criminal prosecution could have on a jurisdiction. He wrote: "We believe justice was served in this
case [Shepard], but not without cost. We have been devastated financially, due to
expenses incurred in bringing Matthew's killers to justice. For example, we had to
lay off five law enforcement staff.""o Many supporters of the legislation were
cognizant of the provision of resources the legislation promised. For example, in a
press release, Rep. Joseph Crowley (D-Bronx and Queens), noted "[a]s the son of a
New York City police officer, I understand first-hand the importance of giving our
local law enforcement the resources they need to prevent crime, and I fully support
the funds made available by this legislation so local officers can work to prevent
and prosecute these crimes to the fullest extent of the law."'" The National District
Attorneys Association also wrote to express support for the bill recognizing that
"such assistance would certainly provide state and local officials with the necessary tools to address crimes motivated by hate."' 1 2
E. Criticismsof the HCPA
1. FederalismConcerns
Although the Act addresses the shortcomings of pre-existing federal bias-crime
legislation, the HCPA implicates important federalism concerns. Opponents of the
expanded federal authority may view the Act as part of a larger trend toward the
"overfederalization" of criminal law." 3 Numerous scholars have examined the

110. See H.R. REP. No. 111-86, at 10 n.16. In contrast to the prosecutors in Laramie, Wyoming, the local law
enforcement agency in Jasper, Texas, received almost $300,000 to assist in the prosecution of James Byrd's
killers. Id. at 10-11.
Ill. Press Release, Rep. Joseph Crowley, Crowley Champions House Passage of Federal Hate Crimes Bill
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://crowley.house.gov/press-release/crowley-champions-house-passage-federalhate-crimes-bill.
112. Letter from National District Attorneys Association, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/hatecrimes/llehcpa/2007/docs/letter-to-kennedy-from-ndaa-04-09-07.pdf.

113. See Beale, supra note 9, at 1231. The HCPA has also been criticized on other grounds. For example, in
Glenn v. Holder,plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act's criminal prohibitions. 738 F. Supp. 2d
718, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2010). The plaintiffs challenged the Act's constitutionality, arguing the criminal provisions
of the Act were overbroad and potentially would violate the plaintiffs' First Amendment free speech rights. Id. at
720. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed for lack of standing, since the Act did not on its face apply to the mere
expression of views against homosexuals and homosexual behavior, and because their claims were not ripe, since
the plaintiffs did not allege that they intended to engage in the violent acts mentioned as punishable under the
statute. Id. at 733. Although the Attorney General argued that the Act did not violate the First Amendment, the
Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Commerce Clause, the court did not reach these issues,
because the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe. Id. at 733-34.
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increased role the federal government has played in the criminal justice system,114
and many of the criticisms surrounding federal hate-crime legislation are similar to
the federalism concerns raised in other instances where Congress has expanded the
federal government's authority in the criminal justice context.' 15 Because the Act
greatly expands the federal government's authority to prosecute hate crimes,
critics have argued the Act is yet another example of the overfederalization of the

criminal law.1 16
Critics of "federalization" of criminal law have articulated several complaints. In general, critics assert that states are harmed in various ways when the
federal government assumes jurisdiction. Criminal justice issues have long been
deemed "local issues" and local and state predominance of these issues is
well-established.'" 7 Specifically, these critics argue an increased role for the
federal government will diminish the local role, which would blur the distinction
between state and federal crimes, as well as subvert local normative preferences
regarding the substantive criminal law." 8 For example, state and local govern-

114. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the CriminalLaw, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2006);
Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the
Country, 58 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 51-62 (2010); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalismand National Sex
Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51 (2008); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006).
115. For example, in the healthcare context, many opponents of the Affordable Health Care Act argue the
federal government's authority under that Act usurps the states sovereignty. See, e.g., DAVID CROCKER, THE CASE
AGAINST OBAMACARE, THE ME. HERITAGE POLICY CTR., 5-6 (Jan.10, 2011), http://www.mainepolicy.org/wp-

content/uploadsfThe-Case-Against-ObamaCare.pdf.
116. See, e.g., David Stout, Hate-CrimesBill Hits Roadblock After Senate Vote, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 12,
2002, at A3 (discussing how federal hate crimes legislation infringes upon state and local enforcement of hate
crimes); Christopher Chorba, Note, The DangerofFederalizing Hate Crimes: CongressionalMisconceptions and
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes PreventionAct, 87 VA. L. REv. 319 (2001) (stating federal
involvement in hate crimes is unnecessary since the states can sufficiently respond to the issue).
117. See, e.g., Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretionand the FederalizationDebate, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968 (1995) ("Other critics believe that some of the recently enacted federal crimes
inappropriately infringe on federalism interests by taking matters traditionally of local concern out of the hands of
local officials."); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1066 (1995)
("[lit is safe to assert that the constitutional foundations of our government generally contemplate a more
restricted role for federal courts than for state courts with regard to criminal cases."); Thomas M. Mengler, The
Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the FederalJudiciaryfrom the Federalizationof State
Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503, 516 (1995) ("These overall benefits of federalism historically have played out in
the criminal enforcement context by allocating chief responsibility for crime enforcement to the states, with the
federal government assisting in those areas in which the states are incapable of undertaking effective enforcement
efforts.").
118. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American Criminal Law,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995) (asserting the federal government has grown from complementing state criminal
law to now being unnecessarily duplicative of state criminal laws); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 643 (1997) (arguing the overfederalization of criminal laws
has led to the disparate treatment of offenders); Eileen M. Connor, The Undermining Influence of the Federal
Death Penalty on Capital Policymaking and Criminal Justice Administration in the States, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 149 (2010) (disputing the need for a federal death penalty and supporting the assertion that there
has been an increase in the federalization of criminal laws).
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ments are currently responsible for nearly ninety-five percent of criminal prosecutions. Thus, as William J. Stuntz artfully notes, "[t]he bottom line is clear: [l]ocal
law enforcement is the main course. Federal law enforcement is, by comparison,
small potatoes." 1l9
Citing the federalist tradition in the United States, some critics immediately
respond that setting criminal justice priorities and policies related to criminal
justice issues is best-suited for the states and local communities directly impacted
by these policies.12 0 This general criticism of federal intervention has been
especially pronounced when Congress expands the federal government's authority
with respect to issues related to substantive criminal law and enforcement.1 2 1
Principles of federalism dictate the federal government should insert itself only
rarely into these issues, and when it does, it should do so cautiously and
delicately. 1 2 2 Senior policy officials with the DOJ have traditionally viewed the
agency as a "backstop," whose authority to act locally is conferred in limited
situations such as when a state or local unit of government fails to observe the
constitutional rights of its citizens or upon the request of the state.' 2 3 The DOJ
adheres to a discretionary policy known as the Petite policy, pursuant to which the
federal government will prosecute a defendant after a state prosecution only to
vindicate a national interest. 12 4 Notwithstanding these policies, over the years,

119. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 786-87 (referencing various statistics showing local governments and local
prosecutors still do most criminal law enforcement); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.2(d) (3d ed. 2007).
120. Mengler, supra note 117, at 516 ("[M]ost crime is local in nature, and consequently, the local community
feels the brunt of the offense. Therefore, the local community arguably should assess the severity and impact of
the offense, the need to deter the conduct and the appropriate means for doing so.").
121. Stephen F Smith, Proportionalityand Federalization,91 VA. L. REv. 879, 881, 929-30 (2005) ("In short,
the problem with federal criminal law is that there is too much of it."). See generally John S. Baker, Jr., State
Police Powers and the Federalizationof Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 673, 676 (1999) ("[E]xplor[ing] whether
local law enforcement can cooperate with federal law enforcement to such an extent that it becomes subservient to
it, thus undermining state power and policy, and possibly state constitutional law.").
122. See Sam J. Ervin, III, The Federalizationof State Crimes: Some Observations and Reflections, 98 W. VA.
L. REV. 761, 765 (1996) (quoting COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 24-25 (Dec. 1995)) ("[C]riminal activity should be prosecuted in a
federal court only in those instances in which state court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal interests
are paramount.").
123. Holder Testimony, supra note 76, at *12 (explaining the Justice Department's policy as a "backstop,"
under which it defers to state and local authorities while making federal resources available); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATEs ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.031A (2007) [hereinafter USAM], available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading-room/usam (setting forth the Justice Department's policy on dual and
successive prosecutions, which requires an Assistant Attorney General to review all such prosecutions to
determine that there is a substantial federal interest that was "demonstrably unvindicated" by state proceedings);
James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the FederalSystem, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 991, 1010 (1999) ("[The
DOJ] has traditionally operated as a backstop designed to catch the significant criminal violations that state
authorities fail to reach or those where state prosecutorial efforts have failed to satisfy the federal government's
separate interest.").
124. USAM, supra note 123. The purposes of this policy are (1) to "protect persons charged with criminal
conduct from the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and punishments for substantially the same act(s)
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Congress has increased the power of the federal government to prosecute a range

of crimes. 1 25
In addition to usurping the criminal justice authority conferred upon states,
critics argue that increasing federal jurisdiction for criminal conduct will overburden the federal criminal justice system. Critics have noted increased federalization
will deplete already scarce federal resources and will cause an administrative
backlog of cases within the federal judiciary.126 The ABA Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law argued the proliferation of federal crimes "tends to
increase the number of prisoners and to strain the capacity of the federal prison

system."1 2 7
Although many scholars have been cautious about the federal government's
increasing authority to prosecute crimes, in supporting their positions, they have
failed to articulate meaningful distinctions between many federal criminal laws
and the specific harms federal hate crimes legislation seeks to address. Hate
crimes, perhaps even more so than many other federal crimes, epitomize the types
of crimes the federal government has a significant interest in prosecuting-they
are inapposite to America's national liberal values and the harms they cause
reverberate beyond the targeted victim.
2. The Role of Symbolism and the HCPA
In addition to the federalism critique, yet another question is whether federal
hate crime legislation can offer more than a symbolic denunciation of biasmotivated violence. While symbolism plays an important role in the expressive

or transaction(s)"; (2) to allow for the "vindicat[ion] [of] substantial federal interests through appropriate federal
prosecutions"; (3) to promote efficient use of departmental resources; and (4) to facilitate federal-state
cooperation in law enforcement. Id.
125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006) (imposing federal criminal sanctions for violence against pet stores, zoos,
aquariums or other "animal enterprises"); 18 U.S.C. §228 (2006) (imposing federal criminal sanctions for the
failure to pay child support); 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006) (imposing federal criminal sanctions for the production,
theft or use of a false ID).
126. Michael A. Simons, ProsecutorialDiscretionand Prosecution Guidelines:A Case Study in Controlling
Federalization,75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,895 (2000) (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (Jan. 1999), available at 1998 WL 1113328) ("The trend to federalize crimes that

traditionally have been handled in state courts not only is taxing the Judiciary's resources and affecting its budget
needs, but it also threatens to change entirely the nature of our federal system."); see also Brickey, supra note 118,
at 1165 (arguing federalization has caused "impending crisis in the federal justice system"); Robert E. Cowen,
Federalization of State Law Questions: Upheaval Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995) (arguing
increased caseload has "increasingly transformed federal judges into administrators and managers no different
than any other bureaucrat"); Ervin, supra note 122, at 761 (arguing Congress's trend toward federalizing crime
could "drastically alter the traditional role of the federal courts in our nation"). But see Little, supra note 117, at
1040 (arguing the criminal case workload has not become unmanageable, because "the number of federal criminal
cases filed today is far below equivalent filings of sixty years ago, yet today there are seven times as many federal
judges.").
127. THE A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL

LAw 40 (1998) (arguing that the federalization of criminal law strains federal prison resources) [hereinafter
A.B.A. TASK FORCE].
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function of criminal law, there are many disadvantages to purely symbolic
legislation, and as discussed below, these dangers are particularly acute in the
context of prosecuting hate crimes.
a. The Dangersof Symbolic Legislation
Because most crime is prosecuted at the local level, federal resources cannot
possibly be adequate to prosecute many bias-motivated crimes that may be within
its jurisdiction. Thus, some observers have argued that like other federal criminal
legislation, for many practical reasons, the HCPA will largely serve a symbolic
purpose to express our nation's distaste and disdain for bias-motivated crimes.12 8
Senior federal officials have always maintained that, even with federal hate crimes
legislation, the federal government would have a limited role in the prosecution
of these crimes. When speaking about an earlier version of the HCPA in 1998,
Eric Holder, who was then Deputy Attorney General for the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, said, "We predict that the enactment of [the hate crime bill]
would result in only a modest increase in the number of hate crimes prosecutions
brought each year by the federal government."12 9 Even with the federal government's newfound authority to pursue hate crimes prosecutions, local jurisdictions
would maintain the primary responsibility for prosecuting hate crimes.13 0
In addition to the pragmatic concerns regarding the federal government's ability
to enforce hate crimes legislation, there are additional concerns if the HCPA is
rendered only a symbolic denunciation of hate crimes. There are several disadvantages of purely symbolic legislation, and these disadvantages affect not only the
victims, but defendants and the general public alike. Clearly, one of the most
important considerations in the criminal justice system is to protect and vindicate
the rights of victims. These considerations are especially important in the context
of hate crimes where victims have reported that the prosecution and punishment of
their assailants is a critical part of the healing process after one has been a victim of
hate crimes.1 3 ' The failure to prosecute even a single perpetrator of a hate crime
sends a message to the victim that society does not condemn the perpetrator's

128. See Logan, supra note 114, at 55-59 (noting recent enactments of federal criminal law); see also A.B.A.
TASK FORCE, supra note 127, at 53 (noting that the "new waves of federal statutes often stand only as symbolic
book prohibitions with few actual prosecutions"); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw,
100 MICH. L. REv. 505,532-33 (2001) (listing federal hate crimes legislation as an example symbolic legislation);
Stuntz, supra note 114, at 844 (arguing Congress uses criminal law "to send messages, not to define prohibited
conduct").
129. Holder Testimony, supra note 76, at *3-*4.
130. Id.
131. See Hate Crime PreventionAct of 1998: Testimony on H.R. 3081, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter McDevitt Testimony] (testimony of Jack McDevitt, Professor, Northeastern
University), 1998 WL 465698 (noting that "[v]ictims have reported that the actions of police and prosecutors are
among the most important elements in the healing process").
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conduct.13 2 This inflicts a secondary psychological harm upon the victim and
further injures those who the law was intended to protect.
Symbolic legislation also has a potentially negative impact on defendants who
are prosecuted pursuant to such legislation. As Sara Sun Beale has explained,
"[a]lthough the scope of prosecutorial discretion is wide in every jurisdiction, the
existence of rarely-used statutes invites (if not demands) selective enforcement
and unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants." 3 3 Beale has also noted
that if the legislation is seen as merely symbolic, this "might encourage Congress
to impose measures that are more expansive or extreme than it might otherwise
adopt."' 34 Similarly, Congress may be less careful in drafting provisions of law
that it views as largely symbolic, which may later cause problems with implementation and enforcement. 135
Finally, symbolic legislation affects the general public and may lead to a rise in
law breaking if respect for the law has eroded due to persistent non- or underenforcement. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The law threatens certain pains if
you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new motive for not doing
them. If you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the pains in order that its threats
may continue to be believed."' 3 6 Plainly stated, if high-profile legislation is
enacted but rarely or never enforced, society reacts by lowering expectations
that the criminal justice system will penalize prohibited behavior. Similarly, failure
to adequately enforce certain laws may cause the law to lose force when it loses
its moral credibility. According to Paul H. Robinson and John Darely, "every
deviation from a desert distribution can incrementally undercut the criminal
law's moral credibility, which in turn can undercut its ability to help in the creation
and internalization of norms and its power to gain compliance by its moral
authority."' 3 7
b. The Importance of Enforcing Hate Crimes Legislation
In- the context of addressing bias-motivated violence, there are additional
concerns with a purely symbolic federal law. While a federal denunciation of these
crimes is inherently valuable, the dangers associated with purely symbolic legislation suggest the federal government should ensure the HCPA is appropriately

132. See Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in
Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 184 (1997) ("When a sanction goes persistently
uninflicted, doubt is cast upon society's future willingness to impose it and, by implication, upon society's
rejection of the underlying conduct.").
133. Beale, supra note 11, at 757. Beale further notes that "[s]tatutes that are applied only rarely give
prosecutors the extraordinary ability to single out and punish one defendant, or perhaps a handful of defendants,
for conduct that is widespread." Id. at 757-58.
134. Beale, supranote 9, at 1269.
135. See id.
136. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 40 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 1963) (1881).

137. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darely, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 477-78 (1997).
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enforced. While all crimes are harmful to society, bias-motivated crimes are
distinct because they cause reverberating harms, not only to the victim, but also to
members of the broader community. Hate crimes are "mechanisms of power
intended to sustain somewhat precarious hierarchies," aimed towards those groups
of people who have traditionally held the least amount of power, in order to send
the message that those victims are, and will continue to be, "stigmatized and
marginalized" by society.138 Although criminal law already prohibits the violence
associated with hate crimes, when victims are chosen because of their actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, gender, or
sexual orientation, the underlying motivation behind these crimes distinguishes
them from other crimes. 13 9 This distinction has long been the rationale for
enhanced penalties associated with hate crimes statutes and thus, hate crimes
legislation should not be relegated to mere symbolic status.' 4 0
Hate crimes cause victims to suffer more severely than victims of other
crimes.141 Because victims of hate crimes are attacked because of their race,
gender, sexuality, disability, or other immutable characteristics, they often feel
heightened senses of vulnerability, as there is no way for them to change the
characteristics about themselves that caused the attack in the first place.14 2 Hate
crime victims may also feel withdrawal, higher levels of depression, anxiety,
feelings of helplessness, sleep disorders, loss of confidence, and a sense of
isolation.14 3 These crimes may also damage communities more severely than other
crimes. Hate crimes affect the targeted community-the group that shares the
characteristics that were the basis for the attack.
For example, when a hate crime occurs, the crime serves as a warning to other
people who share that characteristic, the targeted community. Members of the
targeted community are now on notice that they could also be a victim of
violence,'" and such a message has "the potential to throw an entire community
into paralysis." 4 5 Hate crimes may be direct attacks on individual people, but
138. Jason A. Abel, Americans Under Attack: The Need for Federal Hate Crime Legislation in Light of
Post-September 11 Attacks on Arab Americans and Muslims, 12 ASIAN L.J. 41, 44 (2005); see also Troy A.
Scotting, Hate Crimesand the Needfor StrongerFederalLegislation, 34 AKRON L. REv. 853, 864 (2001) ("[H]ate
crimes are seen as 'message crimes,' in effect, sending 'a message that members of a certain group [ ] are not
wanted in a particular neighborhood, community, workplace, or college campus."' (brackets in original)) (quoting
McDevitt Testimony, supra note 131).
139. Annual Review, supra note 68, at 280.
140. Abel, supranote 138, at 55.
141. Scotting, supra note 138, at 862. ContraArnold Barnes & Paul H. Ephross, The Impact of Hate Violence
on Victims: Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Attacks, 39 SOCIAL WoRK 247, 250 (1994) ("[T]o some
extent, the predominant emotional responses of hate violence victims appear similar to those of victims of other
types of personal crime.").
142. Scotting, supra note 138, at 863.
143. Id. at 862-63.
144. Id. at 864.
145. Abel, supra note 138, at 58 (quoting BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE

CRIMES 72 (2001)).
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members of the targeted community may perceive these crimes as attacks on all
the members of the target community.14 6 In addition to the harmful effects the
targeted group experiences, the broader community also experiences harms. For
example, once one minority group has been targeted by a hate crime, other
minority groups may feel vulnerable to similar attacks.14 7 People who are not
members of the targeted community may feel they will become vulnerable to
attack should they be seen as sympathizers.14 8 Finally, hate crimes work to tear
communities apart by distancing targeted communities from majority group

members.14 9
In the specific context of hate crimes legislation, even supporters have identified
the deleterious effects of enacting "symbolic" legislation, suggesting that such a
gesture is inadequate to effectively address such a complex social issue.15 0 Rather
than sending a strong message against these crimes, the under-enforcement of hate
crimes law may signal officials are not treating these offenses seriously.1 5 ' Some
critics have argued the broad definition of what constitutes a hate crime under the
HCPA may render the bill a "symbolic exercise in identity politics rather than a
response to a real problem." 5 2 Observers have identified myriad reasons (some of
them cynical) legislatures may choose to enact hate crimes legislation in lieu of
other policy solutions. First, enacting criminal legislation may be easier than
developing, implementing, and enforcing more comprehensive strategies to address underlying issues related to hate crimes. 15 3 Furthermore, enacting legislation
may also be less expensive than funding broad social programs that address the
underlying issues that contribute to hate crimes. 15 4
There is also a concern that the simple gesture of enacting a statute to punish
bias-crimes detracts from other efforts to eradicate the underlying cause of
violence against protected groups. There is a danger that even well-meaning policy
makers can be lulled into believing they have sufficiently addressed these issues in
their communities. Susan Gellman notes:
[I]f enacting a largely ineffective ethnic intimidation statute allows us to feel
that we have taken steps to eliminate bigotry and bias-related crime and thus

146. Scotting, supra note 138, at 865.
147. Gellman, supra note 44, at 342.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Shaffer, supra note 45, at 203 (arguing hate crimes law "may be little more than symbolic gestures,
incapable of contributing to the solution of deeply-entrenched social problems").
151. Id.
152. Editorial, Obama'sPromise to Gays, L.A. TtMEs, May 22, 2009, at 32. The editorial author notes the Act's
"definition of hate crimes includes acts of violence motivated by bias based on gender or disability, despite scarce
evidence that such attacks are remotely as prevalent as bias crimes based on race, religion or sexual orientation."
Id.
153. See Shaffer, supra note 45, at 203, 245.
154. Id. at 245.
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reduces somewhat or even entirely our feeling of the urgency of doing more,
the enactment of that law ultimately slows the process of combating bigotry.' 55
Despite the symbolic value of hate crimes legislation, the societal disadvantages to having laws that authorities either refuse or are simply unable to enforce
threaten to undermine symbolic gestures denouncing bias-motivated violence.
Therefore, policymakers should develop and implement strategies to ensure the
statute is not relegated to symbolic status but is enforced when appropriate. Scarce
resources of the federal government and territorial disputes regarding jurisdiction
should not excuse the potential dormancy of such an important piece of legislation.
The next Part discusses how the concept of cooperative federalism can alleviate
the federalism concerns associated with the HCPA and ensure the legislation
remains more than a symbolic gesture.

II. SAVING

THE

HCPA FROM SYMBOLISM: A COOPERATIVE

FEDERALISM MODEL

The HCPA's enactment represents a tension between two important traditions in
American society-the respect for the concept of federalism and the respect for
dignity and equality of all citizens, regardless of race. On one hand, critics of
federal hate crimes legislation are concerned with preserving the important
boundaries between the federal government and state and local governments. Still
others are concerned that the structure of the legislation will relegate the HCPA to a
symbolic law federal officials will enforce in only rare circumstances. Given the
importance of both these traditions, policy makers must pay careful attention to
how the HCPA is ultimately enforced and implemented. The distinct nature of hate
crimes exemplifies the very types of crimes that warrant federal intervention. Not
only are hate crimes abhorrent to America's national liberal values, but these are
the very crimes that may escape prosecution at the state and local level.
A. The Concept of CooperativeFederalism
To resolve these competing tensions, the federal government should implement
one or more of several policy solutions consistent with the concept of cooperative
federalism. An important feature of cooperative federalism regimes, which have
been used in a variety of regulatory contexts, is that Congress and the relevant
federal agency provide the basic framework within which the local agencies act
with respect to setting standards.' 5 6 Instead of adopting a set of uniform standards,
in some statutory schemes these federal standards serve merely as minimum
requirements and local agencies are free to supplement these minimum standards

155. Gellman, supra note 44, at 389.
156. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism,and the Enforcement of the Telecom
Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692 (2001) (describing cooperative federalism statutes generally).
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with measures specifically tailored to the local jurisdiction.15 7
The concept of federalism in American society rarely operates in a purely
dualistic fashion.15 8 Although the federal government has certain enumerated
powers, and all other powers are reserved to the states, the federal government
frequently sets national priorities and Congress passes legislation to regulate and
implement policies aimed at promoting a federal goal.159 Federal programs often
draw criticism from states' rights advocates who assert these programs are
attempts to implement uniform national standards and thereby impede the ability
of states to experiment with diverse policies tailored to their local needs.'" An
additional complexity arises because the federal government, in reality, has
neither the resources nor the expertise to tailor these policies to the localities in
which they are implemented.16 1 Thus, in many instances, Congress must rely on
cooperation and collaboration with state and local governments to achieve federal
goals.16 2 The paradigm of cooperative federalism-and the statutory regimes
bearing its characteristics-addresses this problem by combining federal and state

157. Id. at 1696-97. Weiser notes "[rlather than preempting the authority of state agencies and supplanting
them with federal branch offices, cooperative federalism programs invite state agencies to superintend federal
law." Id. at 1695.
158. Christopher Hamilton and Donald Wells describe dual federalism as "a set of beliefs about ...
economics ... [that] prescribes a particular decentralized political order for the better management, growth, and
enhancement of both national and regional economies." CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON & DONALD T. WELLS, FEDERALISM, POWER, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: A NEW THEORY OF FEDERALISM'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE xiii (1990).

Hamilton and Wells note that the concept of dual federalism is characterized by the notion that "having separate
and equally powerful levels of government is the best kind of macropolitical arrangement," and that "most dual
federalists believe that the more separation, the better the government." Id. at 29, 41. Philip Weiser argues that
despite the Supreme Court's rhetoric of dual federalism in cases such as Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-15
(1999), the reality is "Congress continues to enact 'cooperative federalism' regulatory programs that invite state
agencies to implement federal law." Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 664-65 (2001) (describing how Congress favors cooperative federalism
programs and has in fact rejected the dual federalism regulation model).
159. Much of this "national priority" legislation is passed pursuant to Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. See U.S. CONsT. Art. 1 sec. 8 cl. 2. Some examples of such national priority legislation include the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 206 (2006) (minimum wage), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 82-352, 78 Stat. 241 (protections for civil rights), and the White Slave Traffic Act (The Mann Act), 18 U.S.C.
§2421 (2006) (prevention of prostitution).
160. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L_ & Pol'y REv. 23, 27 (1996) (arguing local
governments should be given autonomy to tailor regulatory solutions to local problems and concerns).
161. See, e.g., Jared Bayer, Comment, Re-Balancing State and FederalPower: Toward a PoliticalPrincipleof
Subsidiarity in the United States, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1421, 1439-40 (2004) (discussing the federal government's
failure to address and resolve narcotics problems despite a uniform federal anti-narcotics policy and explaining
how the majority of enforcement costs are borne by state and local governments).
162. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (stating when
interpreting statutes designed to advance cooperative federalism, "we have not been reluctant to leave a range of
permissible choices to the States"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308-10 (1980) (discussing Medicaid as an
example of the cooperative federalism model "in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to
participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons," and pointing out "[tihe cornerstone of
Medicaid is financial contribution by both the federal government and the participating state").
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authority to achieve federal goals.1 6 3 In general, 'cllooperative federalism programs set forth some uniform federal standards-as embodied in the statute,
federal agency regulation, or both-but leave state agencies with discretion to
implement the federal law, supplement it with more stringent standards, and in
some cases, receive an exemption from federal requirements."' The concept of
cooperative federalism allows the federal government to establish national policies
while simultaneously allowing states and local units of government to determine
how to meet those national standards.16 5 A critical characteristic of the concept of
cooperative federalism is the assumption that the federal, state and local entities
should share authority.16 6
Given the shared authority between state and federal entities, scholars have
described cooperative federalism as an amalgamation of preemptive federalism
(where federal legislation and federal agency action preempt all state action in an
area) and dual federalism (a system in which state and federal authority remain
separate and uncoordinated).' 6 7 "Cooperative federalism" fits most appropriately
within compound federalism, the tradition considered by Hamilton and Wells to
have "always been the main force in determining the sharing, balancing, and
distributionof power and functions among the levels of government." 6 8 Hamilton
and Wells explain that today, "compound federalism has certain prominent
features," which include: (1) creating "constitutionally rooted policy dualism,"
(2) leading to "an increased institutional balance of power," (3) "creating numerous means of political-power balancing," (4) embodying "an important, nationally
shared belief system about federalism," and (5) exhibiting "practical, administrative, and technical forms."I 69
Phillip Weiser explains an important rationale for cooperative federalism is the
recognition that the value of "diversity in federal regulatory programs outweigh[s]
the benefits of demanding uniformity in all situations."17 0 Cooperative federalism
''presumes the supplementation of a uniform minimum standard should be left to
the states," rather than promoting a single standard. 171 Although there is no exact
definition determining which statutory regimes or programs fall under the paradigm of cooperative federalism, the Supreme Court has intimated cooperative

163. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1693 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1696.
165. See, e.g., Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof Social Justice, and Public Assistance Administrative
Hearings,32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 163 (2008) ("The Medicaid, TANF, and Food Stamp programs
were each created by federal statute and are largely federally funded, but they are differently administered in each
of the fifty states.").
166. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1733.
167. Id. at 1697 (explaining cooperative federalism strikes a balance between preemptive federalism and dual
federalism regimes).
168. HAMILTON & WELLS, supra note 158, at 34-35 (1990).
169. Id. at 38-40.
170. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1698.
171. Id. at 1732.
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federalism describes those contexts in which a federal statute allows for state
regulation or implementation to achieve federal policy goals.172
In general, there are myriad benefits to implementing principles of cooperative
federalism in a wide variety of federal regulatory regimes.' 7 3 Philip Weiser has
identified three principle benefits of cooperative federalism regimes: (1) local
tailoring; (2) interstate competition; and (3) experimentation.' 74 First, involving
multiple levels of government to address an issue recognizes the complexity of
solving societal problems and allows the federal government to tailor programs to
local needs.' 7 5 The limited resources of the federal government necessarily mean
the federal government may not have at its disposal the technical expertise or
personnel that it can lend to states for implementation of federal priorities.' 7 6 Thus,
cooperative federalism allows state level constituencies to play important roles in
implementing federal priorities.
Yet another rationale for implementing cooperative federalism programs is that
such programs also allow for the possibility of interstate competition. In such
instances, the federal government sets a minimum standard for compliance,
leaving states with the ability to enact stricter measures. 77 Not only does this
flexibility allow states to "adapt to local conditions"; it also "allows for a degree of
competition between the states for residents, capital, and economic activity" and
gives states the ability to experiment with a variety of approaches.1 7 8
Finally, cooperative federalism schemes allow states discretion to choose
different approaches to address a policy goal and thereby engage in experimentation. Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously articulated the
benefits flowing from the U.S. system of federalism when he noted that states can
serve as "laboratories" for innovative social experiments in his famous dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.179 Since this pronouncement, scholars have noted
Justice Brandies was not advocating that states act in isolation of the federal

172. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (describing the model of cooperative federalism).
173. See Weiser, supra note 156, at 1698.
174. Id. at 1698-1701 (listing these three beneficial characteristics of cooperative-federalism regimes).
175. See Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politicsof Policing:EnsuringStakeholder Collaborationin the Federal
Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 489, 540 (2008) (discussing the
importance of tailoring federal intervention to local needs); Weiser, supra note 156, at 1699.
176. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 1384, 1409-10, 1449-50, 1450 n.268 (2000) (noting-with
respect to police reform-that the federal government has limited resources); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Cooperative Federalismand Wind: A New Frameworkfor Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFsTRA L. REv.
1049, 1055 (2009) (explaining cooperative federalism "provide[s] regulatory uniformity ... without sacrificing
the benefits of local tailoring or experimentation").
177. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1701 (noting the Telecom Act and many environmental statutes are examples
of this minimum standard of compliance framework).
178. Id.
179. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis argued that federal and state governments
must maintain the ability "to remould, [sic] through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to
meet changing social and economic needs." Id.
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government. Instead, scholars have argued his dissent "reflects a theory on the role
of knowledge in solving difficult social problems."' 8 0 Put another way, cooperative federalism allows states to experiment in developing resolutions to important
social issues and can encourage creative problem solving. Federal regulatory
agencies and states then have the benefit of examining information gathered by
individual states and can choose among different approaches before settling on an
approach. Ultimately, the result of state experimentation with a particular policy
solution can also be helpful in identifying a range of acceptable policies for the
federal government to use when formulating policy solutions.
To develop a more robust conceptualization of cooperative federalism, the next
subsection examines this model at work in the context of environmental protection
programs, where it is frequently used.
B. CooperativeFederalismand the EnvironmentalProtection Measures
Cooperative federalism regimes exist in many regulatory contexts, and are
especially prevalent in the environmental context.' 8 ' In the environmental sphere,
the states administer and implement state environmental programs after the
Environmental Protection Agency approves the program and determines the state
policy adheres to federal guidelines. The authorizing legislation for many environmental statutes allows states the flexibility to set local priorities and consider local
needs, as long as they meet the minimum guidelines the federal agency requires. 1 8 2
The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act have all
been characterized as cooperative-federalism regulatory schemes.' 83 For example,

180. John C. Dernbach et al., Making the States Full Partners in a National Climate Change Effort: A
Necessary Elementfor Sustainable Economic Development, 40 ENVrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10597, 10603
(2010) (citing Kirsten H. Engel & Marc L. Miller, State Governance:Leadership on Climate Change, in AGENDA
FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 442, 452 (Envtl. L. Inst., 2009)).
181. See, e.g., Adam Babich, Our Federalism, OurHazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune,54 MD. L. REv.
1516, 1534-42 (1995) (discussing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as a model of
cooperative federalism); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 469, 552-55 (1993)
(discussing certain provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) as models of cooperative
federalism); John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1197-98
(1995) (discussing certain provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as a model of cooperative federalism); Lara
Gelbwasser Freed, Cooperative Federalism Post-Schaffer: The Burden of Proof and Preemption in Special
Education, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103, 104-06 (2009) (discussing the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) as a model of cooperative federalism).
182. See Dernbach,supra note 180, at 10598.
183. Id. at 10597-98 (describing the authorizing legislation of these programs as "cooperative federalism
legislation" and proposing a similar model to address a "comprehensive approach to climate change that
integrates ... all levels of government"); see also Adler, supra note 29, at 576-78; Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays
the Piper Should Call the Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S. Environmental Law, 4 ENvTL. LAW. 779, 783 (1998)
(noting many of the federal environmental statutes "contemplated some form of intergovernmental cooperation
between states and the federal government in implementing the statutory program").
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initially passed in 1970, the Clean Air Act allows the federal government to,
among other things, set "air quality standards, tailpipe emission standards, and
new stationary source standards."' 8 4 The Clean Air Act places responsibility for
controlling air pollution in both state and federal authorities.18 5 Essential features
of the Clean Air Act are National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"),
which are air quality levels that must be achieved nationwide.1 8 6 Although the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is responsible for setting the
NAAQS, states develop state implementation plans ("SIPs") in which they include
numerous ways to control air quality.'"
Under this model, "many key policy choices" are left to the states, but the EPA
maintains "considerable federal oversight."' 8" States are tasked with taking an
inventory of sources of emission; if emissions in the state exceed the NAAQs, the
state decides what level of emission reductions are necessary and what reductions
to make.' 89 States must include monitoring and enforcement programs in their
SIPs and, further, must demonstrate they have adequate funding and personnel to
implement the plans.190
Also, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, states are generally permitted to adopt their
own standards which may be "more stringent" than the federal standards that act as
minimum guidelines. 1 9' The Clean Air Act embodies a "delegated" form of
cooperative federalism, meaning the structure of the Clean Air Act grants states the
authority to implement and enforce federal standards. In this context, the delegation of power is not absolute because "federal oversight precedes most delegations
and remains post-delegation in the form of oversight or implementation and

enforcement."

92

184. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's
Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 799, 817
(2008).
185. Id.; Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon
Dioxide, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 99, 154 (2006); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State
Implementation Plans-Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENvrL. L.J. 209, 211-15 (2004);
Shari Shapiro, Who Should Regulate? Federalism and Conflict in Regulation of Green Buildings, 34 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & Pot'Y REv. 257, 276-77 (2009).
186. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 184, at 817; Giovinazzo, supra note 185, at 154; Reitze, supra note
185, at 211-15; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 276-77.
187. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 184, at 817; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 276-77; Stuart Arkley,
Comment, Changes in the Air: Innovation and Streamlining in the State Implementation Plan Process and
Maintenance ofNationalAirQuality Standards in Minnesota, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 585, 593 (2005).
188. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 184, at 817; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 277; see Arkley, supra
note 187, at 597-98.
189. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 184, at 818; Reitze, supra note 185, at 230-31.
190. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 184, at 818; see Dernbach,supra note 180, at 10604.
191. Dernbach, supra note 180, at 10604; see also William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and
Disappointments: Lessons for Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WAsH.
U. J.L. & PoL'Y 33,61 (2010).
192. Buzbee, supra note 191, at 44; see Dernbach,supra note 180, at 10598.
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Rather than "federaliz[ing] environmental law" or "creat[ing] a federal environmental agency with plenary authority over rulemaking, program administration,
permitting and enforcement," this cooperative federalism scheme has allowed a
"balanced compromise between state and federal authority."1 9 3 Generally, pursuant to these federal programs, the federal government has the authority "to
promulgate national standards, to provide financial incentives to the states to
improve the quality of their programs, and to authorize the states to keep
implementing their programs, as long as they met federal standards." 1 9 4 Some
scholars credit this statutory scheme with increasing the number and quality of
personnel in charge of enforcement, and with resulting in a system which allows
for coordination between states and federal and local governments. 9 5
C. CooperativeFederalismis an AppropriateModel for Crime Prevention
Cooperative federalism is an appropriate model for crime prevention in general.
In addition to the constitutional support for cooperative federalism programs, there
are numerous benefits associated with joint federal-state efforts in the context of
criminal prosecutions.
1. ConstitutionalSupportfor Cooperative FederalismPrograms
Many commentators eschew the notion of the federal government's involvement in various issues, but this criticism is particularly vehement when the federal
government attempts to insert itself in substantive criminal issues. Despite criticism, there is strong constitutional support for cooperative-federalism programs
in the criminal justice context. First, cooperative federalism is rooted in compound federalism, which is "built into the Constitution itself," and the Supreme
Court has specifically found many cooperative federalism programs constitutional.19 6 It is well established that "Congress may: (1) use federal funds as a
'carrot' to induce states to regulate; [and] (2) require federal agencies to impose the
'stick' of preemptive federal requirements if states do not regulate as desired....
Even critics of the federalization of criminal law acknowledge such
laws are themselves constitutional. For example, William Stuntz, a critic of the
federalization of criminal law, notes "constitutional law places few limits on crime
definition, save for crimes that involve speech, consensual sex, or reproduction.
(The large majority of crimes involved none of those things.)"' 9 8

193. Dembach, supra note 180, at 10598.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Nicole Huberfeld, ConditionalSpending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
751, 769 (2010).
196. HAMILTON & WELLS, supra note 158, at 30.

197. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power and the Constitution,
39 ARiz. L. REv. 205, 205-06 (1997).
198. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 790 (citations omitted).
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Critics have also acknowledged Congress can impose federal standards on state
criminal law through indirect, although constitutionally legitimate, means.1 99 As
Wayne Logan explains, "The proliferation of federal criminal laws .. . is only part
of the federalization story; indeed, in practical terms, only a small part," because of
the increase in the federal government's influence over state criminal law through
indirect means. 2o In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the widely accepted proposition that "Congress has no constitutional authority to define crimes and fix sentences for state court cases."2 0 1 Instead
the federal government has achieved many of its criminal policy goals by using its
Spending Power authority to entice the states to adopt federal criminal laws and
standards for sentencing, rather than imposing its will directly using federal
legislation through its Commerce Clause powers.20 2 Again, such methods of
federal-state policymaking have strong constitutional support. 2 0 3
2. Benefits of Joint Federal-StateEfforts in the Context of Criminal
Prosecutions
Despite skepticism about the increased role of the federal government in the
criminal law context, there are numerous benefits associated with an increased
federal presence. 204 Notwithstanding the critics of "overfederalization," there is a
"nationwide consensus and the concomitant popular support for joint state and
federal efforts" and "crime is one arena in which cooperative federalism can work
best." 20 5 For example, legal scholars Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton contend that
arguments regarding excessive or gross misallocation of resources "rest on
incomplete and highly skewed presentations of the available empirical data." 20 6
Specifically, Stacy and Dayton argue the burdens of criminal cases on the federal
judiciary are overstated. They explain the number of criminal cases per judgeship
when measured against the burden of civil cases per judgeship suggests the burden
of criminal cases on the federal judiciary and prosecutors is actually decreasing

199. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism,the Spending Power and Federal CriminalLaw,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1(2003) (recognizing Congress may promote state policies through its conditional Spending
Power while advocating against permitting Congress to create and prosecute federal crimes in that manner);
Logan, supra note 114 (discussing sex offender registration and notification requirements imposed upon states
through the federal government's conditional Spending Power).
200. Logan, supra note 114, at 51-52.
201. Stuntz, supra note 114, at 805.
202. See Logan, supra note 114, at 52,69-74 (discussing federal legislation conditioning federal Byrne Grant
Program funding on states' compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements).
203. Id. at 51. See generally Garnett, supra note 199.
204. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalizationof Crime, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 247,
322-23 (1998) (advocating for increased federal involvement in combatting street crime in poor neighborhoods
because states lack sufficient resources and street crime affects national interests).
205. Id. at 324.
206. Id. at 312.
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proportionally. 20 7 They further suggest criminal cases pose a far greater burden
(almost five times greater) on state courts than on federal courts.20 8 In contrast to
critics of increasing the federal role in criminal law, Stacey and Dayton argue
"[tihe national government should increase its share of enforcement activities,"
thus allowing more federal resources to be allocated toward national crime
prevention efforts in law enforcement, federal prosecution, and federal courts.20 9
Although the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits a government from subjecting an individual to multiple prosecutions, the
doctrine of dual sovereignty permits successive prosecutions by both the state and
federal government. 2 o Although re-prosecution by the federal government after a
state prosecution is possible in some circumstances, federal re-prosecution remains extremely rare. 2 1 1 Institutional policies-specifically the DOJ's Petite
Policy-can ameliorate many of the concerns critics have regarding this overlapping jurisdiction 2 12 because the policy establishes a presumption against such
re-prosecution by the federal government unless, in exceptional circumstances, it
is necessary to vindicate important federal interests.2 13 Harry Litman and Mark D.
Greenberg explain the Petite Policy "dictates that a prior prosecution, regardless of
its result, will be presumed to have vindicated the federal interests involved." 2 14
The circumstances in which federal interests are not vindicated include factors
such as "an incompetent or corrupt prosecutor or judge, an intimidated witness, a
verdict in clear disregard of the evidence, the unavailability of evidence, or the
failure to prove an element of a state offense that is not an element of the relevant
federal offense."215
The presumption against a subsequent federal prosecution is also inapplicable in
two other types of cases. First, if the sentence meted out in the prior prosecution
was "manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest involved" and the federal

prosecution would allow for a "substantially enhanced sentence," the presumption
does not apply.2 16 The presumption can also be overturned if, notwithstanding the
result of the prior prosecution, the case involves a "'compelling federal interest,

207. Id. at 313.
208. Id. at 316.
209. Id. at 323.
210. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) ("It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both
national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by
each."); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (successive prosecutions in different states); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978) (successive tribal court-federal prosecutions of tribe member).
211. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions:A Modelfor ConcurrentFederalJurisdiction,
543 ANNALS Am. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 72, 77 (1996) ("The Justice Department's 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices
and litigating divisions together typically bring fewer than 150 dual prosecutions each year.").
212. See id. at 73, 81-84.
213. See id. at 72.
214. Id. at 76.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing USAM, supra note 123, § 9-2.142(I)(B)(2) (section omitted from current version of manual)).
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particularly one implicating an enduring national priority' and 'egregious conduct,' and the result in the prior prosecution was 'manifestly inadequate in light of
the federal interest involved.'" 2 17
Some critics of cooperative federalism warn that the "nexus" created by
"cooperative relations" between federal and state criminal jurisdictions can have
many negative consequences caused by cooperative federalism's reshaping of
"organizational and political contexts," which would ultimately distort the principles of federalism. 2 18 However, the "wise allocation of federal resources in areas
of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction depends on the selective exercise of
federal prosecutorial discretion," which is enhanced by cooperative federalism's
reliance on relationship-building between different agencies and levels of government.2 19 Prosecutorial discretion is "the most important variable in the federalization process and . .. controlling prosecutorial discretion is the key to controlling
federalization."2 20
Concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state governments can be beneficial
in the context of criminal prosecutions. 2 2 1Adopted in 1995, the Long Range Plan
of the Judicial Conference of the United States generally opposes the federalization of criminal law, yet when making four recommendations that "articulate and
preserve a sound judicial federalism," the authors identified "cooperative federalism" as one means of allowing "the federal government and the states [to] work
together to promote effective civil and criminal justice systems."2 22 Thus, even
though the group generally opposed the federalization of criminal law, it recognized the potential benefits of cooperative federalism and the important role
cooperative federalism schemes could play in achieving balance between federal
and state judicial and criminal justice systems.
The report also recognized the important financial role the federal government
could play in providing crucial funding for state criminal justice systems. For
example, the report recommended making "improvement[s] in state justice sys217. Litman & Greenberg, supra note 211, at 76 (citing USAM, supra note 123, § 9-2.142(I)(B)(3) (section
omitted from current version of manual)).
218. Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in
Cooperationand Discretion,30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 239, 239, 262 (2005).
219. Renee M. Landers, ProsecutorialLimits on Overlapping Federal and State Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 64, 64, 70-71 (1996); see also Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How
Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 573-76 (1999) (arguing certain
efficiencies of crime fighting and resource allocation can be achieved through strategic planning and cooperation
between prosecutors and law enforcement at federal and state levels); Daniel Richman, Prosecutorsand Their
Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (2003) (explaining the importance of horizontal
cooperation between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies at federal and at state levels).
220. Simons, supra note 126, at 893, 930 ("Of the three branches of government, the Executive Branch is the
best equipped to control federalization.").
221. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 211, at 73 (proposing a model of "overlapping federal-state
jurisdiction . . . to address aspects of national problems that the states cannot fully solve"). But see Beale, supra
note 9, at 1275-80.
222. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTs 22 (1995).
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tems, which may require significant federal financial assistance to state courts,
prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies."22 3 Consistent with this recommendation, a prominent feature of the HCPA is the grant assistance and technical
assistance the federal government is authorized to give to jurisdictions to prosecute
hate crimes.224 Furthermore, the report also notes "reduced filings of cases that do
not require a federal forum will enhance the federal courts' abilities to vindicate
rights in other areas of national interest." 2 2 5 In other words, the federal courts
should be used to address issues of particular national interest and cooperative
federalism may have an important role to play in terms of allocating resources and
providing avenues for coordinating the workload of the state and federal courts and
systems of justice.
III. ACHIEVING BALANCE: A FUNCTIONAL MODEL FOR PROSECUTING HATE CRIMES
PURSUANT TO THE

HCPA

It is possible to respect the principles of federalism and respect the power of the
federal government to appropriately enforce the HCPA. While it is important to
allow states to determine their own criminal justice priorities, hate crimes cause
distinct and broad harms that neither states, nor the federal government, should
ignore. Now that the HCPA is law, it is possible the concurrent jurisdiction over
hate crimes may cause tension between local and federal authorities that could
threaten the effectiveness of the new federal legislation. Thus, implementing
certain policies and procedures that will allow states the flexibility to determine
how they will address hate crimes is paramount to the ultimate success of the
HCPA.
The HCPA's jurisdictional limitations stipulate that the federal government may
only initiate a federal prosecution if: (1) the state in which the hate crime occurred
does not have jurisdiction; (2) the state has asked the federal government to
assume jurisdiction; (3) a state prosecution has failed to vindicate the federal
interest against hate-motivated violence; or (4) a federal prosecution is in the
public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice.226 By their nature, the
first two situations, while controversial for some, are unlikely to result in "turf'
disputes between the local and federal prosecutors. The federal government should
carefully structure the collaborative efforts between the local and federal authorities involved in investigating and prosecuting the crime. For example, there may
be challenges in implementation of the HCPA if the federal government initiates a
prosecution after the state has already attempted to prosecute an individual or if the
federal government decides a federal prosecution (rather than a state prosecution)

223. Id.
224. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 3716a (2006).

225. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 222, at 22.

226. 18 U.S.C.A.

§249(b)(1)(A)-(D)

(West 2012).
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is warranted. This Article argues that implementing a Task Force Model and
finding other innovative ways to allow local prosecutors to remain involved in
these prosecutions is consistent with the concept of cooperative federalism. Using
these models for enforcement of federal legislation will alleviate many of the
federalism concerns critics have identified because they allow local stakeholders to
remain involved.
A. Creatinga Federal-StateTask Force to Prosecute Crimes Under the HCPA
The HCPA seems to have been modeled upon the Church Arson Task Force
program, but to date, no official task forces have been formed to specifically
address hate crimes. 2 2 7 The creation of a federal-state task force to monitor,
investigate, and prosecute hate crimes could be an effective way to implement the
concurrent jurisdiction over hate crimes envisioned by the HCPA. The task force
model has been used in several contexts in criminal law, often with great success.
In particular, federal-state task forces have been successfully used to investigate
and prosecute church arsons 228 and to address gun and gang violence. 2 2 9 If
structured correctly, a federal-state task force can prevent territorial disputes and
can simultaneously encourage the local buy-in and cooperation needed to address
hate crimes. There are several task force models that policymakers could use to
structure a multijurisdictional task force to address hate crimes, including the
National Church Arson Task Force and the Safe Streets Initiative.
1. Employing the National Church Arson Task Force as a Model for
Hate Crimes Prosecution
The National Church Arson Task Force ("NCATF') provides an interesting
example of state-federal collaboration for prosecuting church arsons, and the
lessons learned from this partnership should inform the implementation and
enforcement of the HCPA. In 1996, Congress passed the National Church Arson
Prevention Act of 1996 ("NCATFA") in response to an increase in the number of
arsons affecting places of worship. 230 The NCATFA expanded federal jurisdiction
to prosecute "[a]cts of [diestruction or [d]esecration of [p]laces of [r]eligious
[w]orship" by including an interstate commerce requirement.23 ' In addition, it also
made it a crime to deface, damage or destroy "any religious real property because
of the race, color, or ethnic characteristics of any individual associated with that

227. See Beale, supra note 9, at 1274.
228. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, National Church Arson Task Force Releases Fourth Report
(Sept. 15, 2000), availableat http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/1s881.aspx.
229. See Douglas Shur, Safe Streets: CombiningResources to Address Violent Crime, FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Apr. 1995, at 1-6.
230. 142 CONG. REC. E1258-02, E1258 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (extension of remarks by Rep. Henry J.
Hyde), available at 1996 WL 388737.
231. Id. at E1259.
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religious property."232 Shortly after the passage of the Arson Prevention Act,
President Bill Clinton formed the NCATF. Clinton directed the members of the
task force to identify and prosecute the arsonists, help rebuild burned houses of
worship, and offer assistance in preventing more fires.23 3
The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and the Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Enforcement co-chaired the task force, and each had equal authority
and responsibility for achieving the goals of the NCATF. The Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") were also appointed to serve on the NCATF. The
Attorney General directed each designated district to form local task forces
combining federal, state, and local law enforcement resources. A national team of
prosecutors detailed to the task force was located in Washington, D.C., and worked
alongside the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") in whose district the fire
had occurred.2 34
The U.S. Attorney's Office was responsible for sending an "Urgent Report" to
the task force upon learning of any case involving a burned house of worship or
related offense. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights then had the
authority to accept or decline to bring the case. Even if prosecution was declined,
task force arson specialists continued to work with state and local law enforcement
and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute the case. Finally, special arson and
explosives training was made available to investigators and prosecutors through
the ATF.2 3 5
Due to its success, the NCATF's structure should be replicated in the context of
the HCPA. The NCATF was generally successful in reducing the number of arsons
at houses of worship, and in arresting the arsonists. In its four years as a
functioning body, the NCATF noted a decline in arsons and bombings at houses
of worship every year, and a total decline of 53 percent.23 6 The arrest rate of
36.2 percent for cases referred to the task force was more than double the national
average for arson generally.23 7 Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement Jim Johnson attributes part of NCATF's success to the fact that the
investigative and prosecutorial aspects of the NCATF were made equally powerful
and important, and the respective personnel worked alongside each other at every
step.23 8 He described his relationship with the Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights as being "'[j]oined at the hip,"' and attributed much of the success of the

232. Id.
233. Angela F. Williams, Overview of the National Church Arson Task Force, USABULLETIN (Exec. Office of
the U.S. Att'ys, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 10-13.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 10-11.
236. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, supra note 228.
237. Id.
238. David Nissman & Jennifer Bolen, Interview with Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Jim Johnson,
Treasury Department,USABULLErIN (Exec. Office of the U.S. Att'ys, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 3-9.
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task force to this relationship of shared authority and accountability. 239
Yet another attribute of the NCATF was its strength in developing motive
evidence, which is crucial to the success of a prosecution of civil rights cases in
general, and specifically within the church arson context. Authorities provided
explicit guidance to all levels of the investigation on gathering and developing
motive evidence, so that all potential arsons under investigation could be brought
as civil rights cases should the evidence point towards a civil rights violation.
Similarly, in the hate crimes context, developing motive evidence will be important. Therefore, this kind of detailed and explicit guidance written into investigation protocols is especially important when dealing with joint federal and local task
forces, because many law enforcement officers do not routinely develop their cases
from a civil rights perspective. By setting the proper investigation protocols and
ensuring they are followed, a civil rights task force can protect the viability of any
potential civil rights cases and ensure no motive evidence goes undeveloped due to
a lack of knowledge or experience in the pursuit of civil rights cases. 24 0
According to an assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") who worked with the
NCATF, internal information management was also crucial to the task force's
effectiveness. Fred Godwin, an AUSA involved in the NCATF, said when the
NCATF began, various reporting systems and a lack of a unified reporting format
posed difficulties for the police departments and federal agencies involved. 2 4 1
When the agencies in the field agreed to modify their reporting so prosecutors
could receive reports in a single format, the reporting protocols facilitated review
by the U.S. Attorney's Office.24 2 Agents in the field were initially inundated by
requests for information from many different agencies and departments, usually
from offices in Washington, D.C.24 3 The task force designated a single point of
contact for reporting purposes, and then directed all requests for information to
that point of contact.2" This reduced the strain of responding to many different
requests and made the information more readily available to those who needed
it.245 Other task forces should employ this model and designate a single gatekeeper
for information to flow from the field to interested parties, and that gatekeeper
should set the format for reports so that all information is received in a coherent
format.

239. Id.
240. See Angela F. Williams, The Do 'sand Don'ts of Investigating Racially or Religiously Motivated Crimes
Against Churches, USABULLETIN (Exec. Office of the U.S. Att'ys, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 43-48.
241. Fred Godwin, Things I Learnedfrom Those Who Play with Matches, USABULLETIN (Exec. Office of the
U.S. Att'ys, Wash., D.C.), February 1998, at 40-42.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 41-42.
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2. Safe Streets Initiative as a Model for Hate Crimes Prosecution
In addition to the National Church Arson Task Force, federal-state task forces
have been created to address gun and gang-related violence. In January 1992, the
FBI responded to shifting priorities with the end of the cold war by elevating its
Violent Crime and Major Offenders Program ("VCMOP") to a national priority.246
The FBI also reassigned 300 special agents from its counter-intelligence
program to the VCMOP and announced the Safe Streets initiative within the
VCMOP. This initiative established the authority for each special agent-incharge of the 56 FBI field offices to create FBI-sponsored task forces directed
at the national violent crime problem, in cooperation with State and local law
enforcement. 247
The Safe Streets initiative is organized into local task forces, with each FBI field
office having control over their local task force. Each local task force is charged
with joining federal, state, and local resources to combat violent crime, and they
are directed to pursue criminal street gangs based on the enterprise theory of
investigation ("ETI"). 2 4 8 ETI is an investigative model that focuses on dismantling
an entire criminal organization by analyzing the enterprise's full range of criminal
activities, determining which components allow the criminal enterprise to operate
and exploiting identified vulnerable areas within each component. It is a labor and
resource intensive investigative technique, designed to take down entire criminal
organizations in a single investigation rather than investigating each crime committed by the organization as it occurs. 2 4 9 Federal funding is authorized to reimburse
state and local law enforcement for overtime and training. 250 Local officers on the
task force are deputized by the FBI and given a top secret security clearance.25 1
Beyond these few directives, each field office is free to innovate and work with
state and local law enforcement in the ways that best suit their needs.
Between fiscal years 1991 and 2000, task forces in the Safe Streets initiative
made over 187,000 arrests, filed over 52,900 complaints or warrants, and returned
over 64,000 indictments that led to over 76,000 convictions.25 2 Because the Safe
Streets initiative combines different law enforcement agencies in different ways
depending on the specific FBI field office in question, it can be difficult to track
overall improvements on a national level. However, individual Safe Streets
initiative task forces, such as the Garrett Mountain Violent Crimes/Fugitive Safe
246. Shur, supra note 229, at 1.
247. Id.
248. Richard M. McFeely, Enterprise Theory of Investigation, FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, May 2001,
at 19-25.
249. Id.
250. FBI, SAFE STREET AND VioLENT CRIME INrIATIVE REPORtr 3 (2000), http://sandiegohealth.org/crinme/violence/
ssgu00.pdf.
251. Shur, supra note 229, at 4.
252. FBI, supra note 250, at 4.
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Streets Task Force ("GMTF") and the Wichita-Sedgwick County Violent Crimes/
Gangs Joint Task Force, have reported great success.2 53 The Garrett Mountain task
force, based in northern New Jersey, is made up of 10 FBI special agents and
officers from 8 local law enforcement agencies.2 54 Between May 1992 and August
1994, the GMTF reported a 24 percent drop in violent crime and a seventeen
percent reduction in overall crime in Clifton, NJ.2 55 Towns of similar size reported
an average drop of only two and one percent, respectively, over the same time
period.256 The FBI has reimbursed roughly 80 percent of the overtime costs of
running the GMTF, making the program affordable to the local agencies.2 57
A close analysis of NCATF and the Safe Streets Initiative can inform implementation of Hate Crime Prevention Act. The success of these programs illustrates the
dramatic results possible when the federal government and local agencies act
collaboratively. Both the NCATF and the Safe Streets Initiative benefited from the
combination of federal funding and prosecutorial resources with state and local
investigative resources such as knowledgeable detectives and well-developed
confidential informants. Just as with the NCATF and the Safe Streets Initiative, the
local prosecutors work to investigate and develop the cases while under the
guidance of the federal government. Similarly, a Hate Crime Prevention Task
Force, structured along the lines of the NCATF, could harness the local talent and
knowledge of state prosecutors but with the condition that these actors were
ultimately accountable to the federal government.
B. Allowing State Prosecutorsto Prosecute in FederalCourt
Allowing state prosecutors to prosecute HCPA cases in federal court is one way
in which state actors could play an important role in an HCPA prosecution.
Appointing Special AUSAs is one practical method of allowing this federal-state
collaboration. Such a proposal however, should retain an important oversight role
for the federal government.
1. Proposalto Appoint Special Assistant United States Attorneys to Prosecute
HCPA Cases
In addition to the creation of a Hate Crimes Prevention Task Force, another
solution consistent with cooperative federalism would allow state prosecutors to
prosecute crimes under the HCPA in federal court. Pursuant to this proposal
Congress could amend the HCPA to contain a provision that would allow the
federal government, upon request from a state, to designate a state prosecutor as a

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Shur, supra note 229, at 3, 7.
Id. at 1-6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Special United States Attorney for the purpose of prosecuting crimes under the
HCPA. Given arguments that local prosecutors are best suited to prosecute violent
crime, these prosecutors could provide valuable assistance to federal prosecutors
in preparing and prosecuting the hate crimes.258 To thwart claims of federal
intrusiveness, federal prosecutors should work closely with local/state prosecutors
to develop and investigate possible cases under the HCPA. Allowing state
prosecutors to be involved in these prosecutions (those in which the federal
government has determined that it will prosecute) respects the state autonomy
many critics of federalization claim is threatened by the creation of federal
criminal law.259 Unless the federal prosecutors have reason to believe the state
prosecutors will not fairly prosecute the case or will in some way undermine the
prosecution, once the federal government has become involved, state prosecutors
would be able to play a role in the prosecution.
Federal law currently authorizes the designation of Special U.S. Attorneys
("SAUSAs") to work with U.S. Attorneys to prosecute certain types of cases.
Section 543 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act authorizes the Attorney
General to "appoint attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public
interest so requires." 26 0 Courts have generally interpreted this legislation to confer
broad authority on the Attorney General and have generally adhered to the plain
language of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedures Act.26 1
In order to address the inherent federalism issues in the HCPA and simultaneously respect the need for the federal government to adequately enforce the
legislation, the federal government could invite local and state prosecutors to assist
in the prosecution of hate crimes that fell within the jurisdiction of the HCPA.
Pursuant to § 543 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, the Attorney General
could designate local and state district attorneys to prosecute HCPA cases in
federal court. Allowing for these appointments would potentially allow more
prosecutions to occur.2 62 The availability of additional prosecutors would mean the
federal government would not be forced to forgo prosecutions because of scarce
resources. In turn, the ability to prosecute cases that were appropriately brought
pursuant to the HCPA would send the signal that the legislation and its goals are
not merely symbolic.
258. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the Proper Limits for Federal
CriminalJurisdiction,46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 994 (1995) ("Decentralizing prosecutorial decision making also has
substantial advantages. State criminal laws are enforced by elected state and local prosecutors who are intimately
familiar with local conditions and politically accountable to their varied constituencies.").
259. See Logan, supra note 114, at 90 ("Disrespect for state autonomy has been particularly evident in the
exercise of rule-making authority delegated to the Attorney General.").
260. 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006).
261. Victoria Killion, Note, No Pointsfor the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role of Special Assistant United
States Attorneys in the CooperativeModel of FederalProsecutions,82 TEM. L. REv. 789, 793 (2009).
262. See id. at 796 ("SAUSAs alleviate a U.S. Attorney's caseload, provide staffing for special projects, bring
under-prosecuted offenses and under-represented victims to the national spotlight, and fill jurisdictional gaps
where another court lacks authority to adjudicate a case.").
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Perhaps more importantly, the involvement of SAUSAs from local or state
prosecutors' offices would allow these non-federal prosecutors to lend their local
expertise. Commentators have noted numerous benefits of having a state or local
prosecutor participate in the investigation and prosecution of federal crimes. For
example, local prosecutors who have been involved in investigations prior to the
federal indictment "probably [have] a handle on the strengths and weaknesses of
the case[s], and [have] likely built up a rapport with potential witnesses." 26 3 The
proximity to the investigation could be invaluable to a successful federal prosecution.
There are certainly disadvantages associated with appointing SAUSAs, but
any potential disadvantages could be overcome. Observers have noted potential
conflicts of interest might arise as well as the increased possibility for selective or
vindictive prosecution. 264 While these risks are certainly possible, they seem
unlikely for numerous reasons, and particularly unlikely to occur in the context of
enforcing hate crimes legislation. First, prosecutors are bound by ethical rules, as
are all practicing attorneys, and there is little evidence to suggest the structure of
this proposal would make such professional misconduct more likely. While
prosecutorial misconduct certainly occurs, selective and vindictive prosecutions
typically involve purposeful, rather than negligent or inadvertent acts. However, in
the context of hate crimes there is nothing to suggest allowing state or local
prosecutors to prosecute these cases in federal court would increase the likelihood
of misconduct. These are likely to be high-profile prosecutions, heavily scrutinized
by both the public and federal government.26 5
2. The Importance of Maintaining a Role for FederalProsecutors
The creation of an HCPA Task Force or the proposal to allow state prosecutors a
role in the prosecution of hate crimes does not mean the federal government should
abdicate its role. On the contrary, the federal government should remain involved
in these prosecutions and should be the ultimate decision maker to ensure the goals
underlying the HCPA are met. Pursuant to this proposal, federal prosecutors should
maintain ultimate authority in the enforcement of the legislation. While there are
many benefits to involving local prosecutors, there are myriad benefits to allowing
federal prosecutors to remain involved. For various reasons, federal prosecutors
can and should be involved in the prosecutions.
For example, as Chief of Crime Control Strategies in the U.S. Attorney's Office

263. Id. at 798.
264. Id. at 798-801.
265. In March 2012, the shooting death of Trayvon Martin and the federal investigation of his assailant
pursuant to the HCPA generated hundreds of news stories. In March 2012, a Change.orgpetition to have his killer,
George Zimmerman, arrested for the crime reached nearly one million signatures. See Outrage, Protests Grow
Over Shooting of UnarmedFlorida Teen, CNN.coM (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/21/
justice/florida-teen-shooting/index.html.
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for the Southern District of New York, Elizabeth Glazer advocated for the strategic
utilization of federal prosecutors as crime fighters, not simply "case processors,"
and noted several examples of success in combating violent crime through federal
prosecution.26 6 Glazer's primary argument is that federal prosecutors could have a
significant impact on crime if they were able to "organize their knowledge and
harness it to particular objectives in which remedies beyond simple arrest and
conviction would be considered." 2 6 7 She argues federal prosecutors often have a
"panoramic view" of the various agency investigations and thus are able to gather
information from many agencies and discern trends and patterns individual
investigators are not equipped to see. 26 8 Furthermore, she suggests federal prosecutors have the impartiality to direct investigative resources without being affected
by agency infighting.269 She concludes that federal prosecutors should use their
unique position and knowledge to direct state and federal crime fighting resources
towards a crime-reduction goal specific to their district.27 0 Viewed in this light,
federal prosecutors are the ideal leaders for devising and implementing a strategy
to sustain long-term decreases in crime.
As reporters for the Three-Branch Roundtable on "Overlapping and Separate
Spheres ... State and Federal Jurisdiction," Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg
identify "four prominent mechanisms for federal-state cooperation within the
executive branch: the Executive Working Group of federal, state, and local
prosecutors; Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees; individual federal-state
task forces; and coordinated case targeting." 27 1 According to Litman and Greenberg, participants at the Roundtable noted that Executive Working Group Meetings
"serve to establish personal cooperative relationships among state, local, and
federal prosecutors."27 2 Conference participants also noted Task Forces addressing
specific law enforcement problems, "minimize discord and turf wars," between
agencies and levels of government and "have resulted in more effective use of
limited resources, a reduction in duplication, and more rational and coherent
approaches to particular crime problems."27 3 Reportedly, Roundtable participants
also "agreed that coordinated case targeting has been a highly successful cooperative mechanism," although the "two most noteworthy examples" both targeted

266. Glazer, supra note 219, at 606.
267. Id. at 574.
268. Id. at 575.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 596.
271. Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, Reporters Draftfor the Working Group on Federal-StateCooperation,
46 HASTINGs L.J. 1319, 1319 (1995). The Three-Branch Roundtable, convened by then-Attorney General Janet
Reno, was a discussion among state and federal judges, legislators and prosecutors. Id. During the meeting,
working groups were established to discuss the mission of the federal courts, principles for the federalization of
civil and criminal law, and federal-state cooperation. See Janet Reno, Remarks, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1009 (1996).
272. Litman & Greenberg, supra note 271, at 1320.
273. Id. at 1324.
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violent career or repeat offenders.274
Federal-state collaborations are not without challenges. The National Institute
of Justice commissioned Abt Associates Inc. to provide a historical overview of the
growth of federal-local law enforcement collaboration, resulting in the release of
its report in May 2000.275 According to the Executive Summary,
[I]n the last two decades three new phenomena in Federal-local law enforcement cooperation have emerged on a broad scale: (1) operational collaboration ... (2) expanded exercise of discretionary Federal criminal jurisdiction
and use of Federal criminal prosecution ... and (3) facilitation of law enforcement coordination and problem solving at the local level.2 76
Such developments, however, "created three significant tensions"; problems
associated with the federalization of crime, the appropriate organization and
governance of Federal-local law enforcement collaboration, and operational strains
emerging from overlapping missions and investigations.2 77 These challenges are
not insurmountable. The report noted "evidence suggests that Federal and local
law enforcement authorities have significantly diffused these potential tensions by
relying on practical mechanisms and organizational steps," such as restraint in the
exercise of Federal jurisdiction, commitment by Federal authorities to cooperate
effectuated through negotiated memoranda of understanding and special operational procedures, and increased Federal efforts to facilitate consensus-based
278
coordination of collaborative and non-collaborative law enforcement activities.
These findings suggest cooperative federalism can be effectively managed in ways
that will enhance efficiencies and reduce potential negative effects of greater
federalization of criminal law.
CONCLUSION

After a long history of attempting to address the issue of bias-motivated
violence, Congress enacted the HCPA. This enactment is a proclamation that
violent acts committed against victims merely because of their race, nationality,
religion, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation have no place in America
and will not be tolerated. Although critics would dismiss the legislation as only
another instance of the "overfederalization of criminal law," in reality, the
provisions of the HCPA are consistent with cooperative federalism. The HCPA
envisions the federal government and states working collaboratively to address
hate crimes. Rather than usurping the states' ability to prosecute local crimes, the
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HCPA is an opportunity for the federal government to assist states, through
financial and technical assistance, in prosecuting hate crimes. The HCPA respects
the principles of federalism because only in limited instances will the federal
government have jurisdiction to prosecute these cases.
However, the respect for federalism and the importance of appropriately enforcing the law is a delicate balance. Federal prosecutors must be willing to
enforce the legislation in a manner that does not render it merely a symbolic
denouncement of hate crimes. While a strong federal pronouncement against hate
crimes legislation is valuable, it is inadequate to properly address the serious
problem of bias-related crime in the United States. Consistent with cooperative
federalism, the HCPA should allow for creative mechanisms to harness the
knowledge of local prosecutors, as well as the creation of multijurisdictional tasks
forces to combat hate crimes. At the same time, the HCPA should maintain a role
for the federal government. By implementing these suggestions, Congress will
ensure the HCPA meets its goals while preserving the important balance of
federalism in the criminal law enforcement context.

